77 Responses to “Extremely important. Need research to resubmit to SCOTUS”

1. Tony
   May 24th, 2009 @ 2:58 am

   Articles written @ WND states Obama’s records in Kenya have been sealed.

2. sillyhaha
   May 24th, 2009 @ 3:23 am

   Dr. Taitz,

   This is exciting!!! I feel very encouraged by this new development.

   I do have one question, which is not about Souter ;o). Do Ambassadors have access to and can they provide passport information and visas?

   Keep fighting the good fight, and God bless!

3. American Patriot
   May 24th, 2009 @ 5:06 am

   Orly, this is too important to leave to the research and interpretation of the readers here. I know all are well intentioned, but will take a well-trained legal mind ensure that nothing is overlooked and also that only pertinent data is included.

   I think you may need to hunker down and lock yourself up with the law books and go over some case law. As an attorney, you are the bottom line here. Further dependence on amateurs can only get us so far and I am confident that we have long passed that line.

4. Michael
   May 24th, 2009 @ 5:19 am

   One important thing to note is the pleadings are not to be combined.

   Which means a separate pleading for each ambassador.

   Would that be right?

   What are the benefits?

   And with regard to the ‘original but not exclusive jurisdiction’ …….. would this not indicate that if one’s case failed with SCOTUS, then one could subsequently file with a lower court ……… or would it be beneficial to file simultaneously with both SCOTUS and the lower court, rather than subsequently?

5. Michael
   May 24th, 2009 @ 5:24 am

   Orly,
   Here is a link that may be helpful.

   https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adminlaw/supreme_court/

6. Michael
   May 24th, 2009 @ 5:29 am

   Found this at

   https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adminlaw/supreme_court/

   [quote]Theory: Judicial review of rulemaking

   New on SSRN: “Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking” by Scott A. Keller (presently a Bristow Fellow at the Office of the Solicitor General, USDoJ and future law clerk to Justice Anthony M. Kennedy). Abstract:
   Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking currently give judges a significant amount of discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators have recognized that this has politicized judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis that they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential administration.

   This Article therefore argues for the elimination of the Supreme Court’s dicta on the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. In their place, courts should establish a doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking that examines only the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used by the agency to achieve that purpose – instead of giving courts leeway to impose additional procedures on agencies and to nitpick rulemaking records. Constitutional doctrines for reviewing legislation already focus on a government actor’s purpose and means, so these doctrines should also be used for reviewing agency rules, which are legislative-like pronouncements that are binding with the force of law.

   Ultimately, this Article proposes that courts should review agency rulemaking under the standard for reviewing legislation known as rational basis with bite. Rational basis with bite would require the agency, at the time it promulgates a rule, to articulate its actual statutory purpose in promulgating the rule and explain how the rule is rationally related to that purpose. Not only would rational basis with bite significantly limit the ability of judges to invalidate agency rules based on policy disagreements, but the Supreme Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review fit quite well with the rational basis with bite doctrine.

   EMM[/quote]

7. Law Complexitiy
   May 24th, 2009 @ 9:36 am

   IMPORTANT — The Justiciability of Eligibility — POTUS JUSTICIABILITY MICHIGAN STATE LAW SCHOOL PROFESSORS OPINION

   Dr. Orly “URGENTLY” needs everyone’s help with this issue.

   Months ago the “SIAP” POTUS removal process was evaluated by Michigan State Law Constitutional Law Professors. The conclusion of the analysis of a POTUS removal is in red though reading the whole complexity of what the attorneys are facing is further described in the law review at length by the law professors.

   The Constitutional Law professors indicate:

   WHY WE NEED MILLIONS of citizens complaints to representatives to MOVE the AG’s and Courts into action.

   TWO BUSINESS CARD FILES are ATTACHED for your use.
   Can you all activate your friends using business cards with the issues of the “SIAP” usurper facts listed on the card, and include Dr.Orlys website too on the business card. Hand the business cards out to shoppers at malls, cocktail lounges, bars, restaurants.

   Conclusion
   The current federal lawsuits challenging the presidential candidates’ eligibility to serve as president are not justiciable, and it is questionable whether any justiciable case could be brought in federal court as an initial matter. Fortunately, there are alternative means to adjudicate this matter that are consistent with the U.S. Constitution. The most promising is a preelection state-court lawsuit seeking to keep an allegedly unqualified candidate off the ballot. In the event that a renegade state court rejects a candidate who is, in fact, eligible or that two or more state courts reach conflicting conclusions on a candidate’s eligibility, U.S. Supreme Court review should be available as a backstop. This avenue seems less fraught with peril than congressional resolution of the matter, given Congress’ dubious legal authority to not count electoral votes of a candidate it believes ineligible. Those who seek to challenge a presidential candidate’s eligibility would thus be well-advised to dust off their state election codes and head to state court.
   *********************************
   The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?
   Daniel P. Tokaji *†
   * Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law; Associate Director, Election Law @ Moritz, https://electionlaw.osu.edu. Thanks to Jack Chin and Richard Winger for their comments, and to Ben Kington for his research assistance.
   † Suggested citation: Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 31 (2008), https://
   http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/tokaji.pdf.

   Introduction
   The 2008 election cycle has been a busy one for legal disputes over the qualifications of presidential candidates, with federal cases having been filed to challenge both major candidates’ eligibility under the “natural born Citizen” clause. These cases unquestionably present vital questions of constitutional law, touching on matters of self-evident national importance. It is doubtful, however, that they are justiciable in lower federal courts. Standing requirements and the political question doctrine make it unlikely that a federal court will reach the merits in cases of the type filed to date.

   That does not mean that all hope is lost for those seeking to challenge the eligibility of John McCain, Barack Obama, or future presidential candidates. There are other avenues through which the issue might be adjudicated. The most plausible is an action in state court challenging an allegedly ineligible candidate’s access to the ballot, which would not present the same justiciability obstacles. Though state-court challenges to a presidential candidate’s eligibility raise concerns about consistency and political bias, the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in such cases would provide a check against such abuses. In the event that a renegade state court wrongly disqualified a presidential candidate, or that there were an interstate conflict over a particular candidate’s eligibility, the Court would have a vitally important role to play in resolving the issue. Another possibility is that Congress could decide the eligibility of a presidential candidate through its constitutionally assigned role in counting Electoral College votes. The existence of these two alternative means to adjudicate a presidential candidate’s eligibility strengthens the arguments against the justiciability of the federal lawsuits filed to date.

   I. Federal Lawsuits Challenging Presidential Eligibility
   Three cases have challenged McCain’s eligibility on the ground that he is ineligible due to his birth in the Panama Canal Zone. The first case, Inland Empire Voters v. United States, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The skeletal complaint alleged that McCain was ineligible to serve as President and sought declaratory relief, without providing any explanation of why the named plaintiffs had standing. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that case in April 2008.

   In the meantime, a second case, Hollander v. McCain, was filed in a New Hampshire federal district court. The plaintiff, Fred Hollander, is a registered Republican who alleged that he planned to vote in the 2008 election. Hollander claimed that the nomination of a candidate who was ineligible to serve under Article II of the Constitution “disenfranchised” him and other voters. He sought not only a declaration of McCain’s ineligibility, but also an injunction requiring that McCain withdraw his candidacy and that the Republican National Committee reassign McCain’s delegates to other candidates and nominate a qualified candidate. The district court dismissed Hollander’s case, concluding that he presented only a “generalized interest” shared in common with other citizens that failed to satisfy the injury- in-fact requirement for standing under Article III.

   The third federal case challenging McCain’s eligibility, Robinson v. Bowen, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in August 2008. Plaintiff in that case, Markham Robinson, is the chairperson-elect of the American Independent Party (“AIP”) and a wouldbe elector in support of the AIP’s candidate, Alan Keyes. Robinson thus asserted that he had a more direct interest than an ordinary voter. In particular, the complaint alleged that Robinson’s status as a potential presidential elector and chairperson-elect of a competing party was sufficient to confer standing. The district court nevertheless dismissed the case, concluding that Robinson lacked standing because he claimed no imminent and particularized injury. In addition, the court concluded that the Electoral College process provided an appropriate means by which to resolve disputes over a presidential candidate’s eligibility. Referring to the process by which members of Congress may raise objections to the counting of certain electoral votes, the court concluded that “[j]udicial review—if any—should occur only after the electoral and Congressional processes have run their course.”

   Another case challenged Senator Obama’s eligibility to serve as president. The complaint in Berg v. Obama was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania shortly before the 2008 Democratic National Convention. It alleged that Obama does not satisfy the Constitution’s natural born citizen requirement because he was born in Kenya, not Hawaii as he claims. The complaint also claimed that, by virtue of Obama’s moving to Indonesia with his mother as a child, he lost his U.S. citizenship. Although the assertions in this complaint are extremely far-fetched, in the highly unlikely event that these allegations could be proven, they appear to present a strong argument against Obama’s eligibility.

   II. Justiciability Problems with the Federal Lawsuits
   Under current case law, plaintiffs in the cases challenging the presidential candidates’ eligibility probably lack standing. In fact, it is questionable whether anyone would have standing to challenge a presidential candidate’s eligibility in federal court as an initial matter, due to the prudential limitations on standing. There is also a serious question about whether the suits should be deemed nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.

   The three requirements for Article III standing are well-established and easy to state, though often more difficult to apply. First, as described in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and other cases, the plaintiff must show an “injury in fact.” That requires that the injury be “concrete and particularized” as well as “real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” There is no bright-line rule for ascertaining whether an injury is sufficiently imminent to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong, but the Court has said that an asserted right to have the government act in accordance with the law is not sufficient. In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Court held that parents of black schoolchildren lacked standing to challenge the IRS’s failure adequately to enforce its prohibition on tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, holding that the “stigmatic” injury that plaintiffs claimed was too abstract. Second, plaintiff must show causation, meaning that the injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Third, plaintiff must establish redressability, meaning that a court is likely to remedy the injury by a favorable court decision.

   The injury-in-fact requirement is the most serious barrier to Article III standing in the presidential eligibility cases. To meet this requirement, plaintiffs must have a “personal stake” in the controversy that goes beyond that possessed by other members of the public. Thus, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, the Court concluded that citizens lacked standing to enforce the constitutional prohibition on members of Congress serving in the executive branch. Such a “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance” was insufficient. Under this precedent, the plaintiffs in Inland Empire Voters, Hollander, and Berg probably lack Article III standing.

   The plaintiff in Robinson, a would-be elector for a minor party candidate, has a somewhat stronger claim of injury than the plaintiffs in the other cases. But while his interest may be somewhat stronger than that of other members of the public, such a plaintiff still has a serious Article III standing problem. The chances of the candidate winning any electors from any state—whether or not McCain is in the race—are exceedingly remote. On occasion, the Court has found an impediment to competition sufficient to establish standing. There is also a Seventh Circuit case, Fulani v. Hogsett, in which a minor-party presidential candidate was held to have standing to challenge the certification of both major parties’ 1988 presidential candidates. In that case, however, the court found that the minor party candidate “could conceivably have won the Indiana election” if she obtained the relief sought. By contrast, Robinson’s preferred candidate Alan Keyes is exceedingly unlikely to win any electoral votes in California, even if McCain were disqualified. Robinson’s claim of injury is thus too speculative and insufficiently imminent to satisfy Article III, as the district court correctly concluded.

   Even if plaintiffs challenging the candidates’ eligibility could meet the requirements of Article III, they would still have to satisfy the prudential requirements for standing. Courts generally describe these as “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” While the precise boundaries of prudential standing remain nebulous, the Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow defined it as encompassing three separate bars: (1) the general prohibition on raising another person’s legal rights, sometimes referred to as “third-party standing,” (2) the prohibition on the resolution of “generalized grievances” that should be addressed to the political branches, and (3) the prohibition on hearing the claims outside the “zone of interests” protected by federal law. What unifies these strands of prudential standing, the Newdow Court explained (quoting Warth v. Seldin), is a concern that “courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”

   Understood in this way, prudential standing presents formidable difficulties for these plaintiffs and, indeed, for anyone seeking to challenge a presidential candidates’ qualifications in federal court. The “generalized grievance” component of prudential standing is especially germane to the eligibility cases. This requirement partly overlaps with the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III, but it sweeps even more broadly. The interest in not having a president who is eligible to serve is quintessentially “generalized,” since it is shared with every other American citizen. The Warth-Newdow language suggests that federal courts should be especially reluctant to find standing in cases asserting a “structural” constitutional violation—like the prohibition on members of Congress serving in the executive branch or the requirement that a president be a natural born citizen—as opposed to the violation of individual rights. As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky stated, such a broad reading of the generalized grievance requirement for prudential standing would “read these clauses out of the Constitution,” at least in terms of their enforceability through federal court lawsuits.

   This is not to say that prudential standing is lacking in all cases alleging structural violations. There are some cases in which a plaintiff would have a stronger claim to standing. That is particularly true of cases in which the interests of incumbent elected officials conflict with the interests of voters generally, and federal judicial intervention is necessary to correct selfentrenching conduct. An example is Reynolds v. Sims and the “one person, one vote” line of cases or, more recently, partisan gerrymandering cases such as Vieth v. Jubelirer. Of course, these cases (unlike the eligibility cases) can at least be framed as involving individual rights to equal treatment. Moreover, there is an identifiable group of voters whose collective interests are negatively affected by the challenged action. The same is not true in a challenge to a presidential candidate’s eligibility.

   Even if a court found a political party or its candidate to have some more pressing interest than the ordinary citizen, the question of institutional competence remains. Are federal courts the best institution, or at least an appropriate institution, to resolve this sort of dispute? If the answer to this question is no, then prudential standing would arguably bar not only minor parties and their candidates, but also major parties and their candidates. If Obama were to file a federal lawsuit challenging McCain’s eligibility, there would be a much stronger claim of injury than in a case brought by the AIP or its candidate. Obama could plausibly claim that he is suffering an injury that satisfies Article III through the diminution in his own chances to win Electoral College votes and, therefore, to become president. The more difficult obstacle for Obama would be prudential standing. The same would hold true in the extremely improbable event that McCain’s running mate, Governor Sarah Palin, were to file a federal lawsuit challenging his eligibility (either before or after the presidential election). It is at least open to question whether courts are institutionally competent to address this dispute, which does not clearly involve the protection of individual rights or self-entrenching conduct by elected officials. If they are not, then it is quite possible that no one would satisfy the prudential standing requirements.

   I do not mean to overstate the argument against prudential standing, especially since the doctrine necessarily requires some discretionary judgments on the part of federal courts. The Court has not definitively precluded standing in cases that allege structural constitutional violations rather than violation of individual constitutional rights. Nor has it ruled on whether federal courts are institutionally competent to adjudicate the eligibility of a presidential candidate. But to decide this question, a federal court would have to consider whether there are other institutions better suited to resolve the question. I suspect that most federal judges would be strongly disinclined to take on the question of a presidential candidate’s eligibility if there were some other way of resolving the question. That would be especially true once the major parties’ chose their presumptive nominees through the primary and caucus processes. Citizens participating in this process, after all, have access to information regarding the circumstances of the candidates’ birth. For a federal court to repudiate citizens’ choices of their preferred candidates would surely be seen as an arrogation of political power, to which Bush v. Gore would pale in comparison. It is hard to imagine that many judges would be willing to go out on such a limb.

   This suggests another potential bar to the justiciability of a case challenging the eligibility of a political candidate: the political question doctrine.

   Under the political question doctrine, certain categories of cases—such as those alleging a violation of the Republican Guarantee Clause—are not justiciable in federal courts. This doctrine stems from the separation of powers, the idea being that the Constitution impliedly entrusts certain decisions to one or both of the political branches. The modern formulation of the test, articulated in Baker v. Carr, looks in part to whether there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” This is not exactly the same as saying that another institution is more competent to address the matter, but it is similar. A plaintiff seeking to challenge a presidential candidate’s qualifications would need to overcome the objection that this matter is textually committed to another branch.

   Powell v. McCormack is the political question case that presents the closest analogy to the presidential eligibility issue. In that case, the Court held that the House of Representatives’ decision to exclude a congressman who undisputedly met the qualifications set forth in Article I of the Constitution did not present a political question. The power to exclude a qualified representative did not belong to Congress. Powell suggests, however, that a dispute over whether a member of Congress really did meet the constitutional qualifications would be a nonjusticiable political question. Suppose, for example, there were a controversy over whether a newly elected congresswoman were really twenty five years old, as the Constitution requires. Such a dispute would probably present a political question because the Constitution confers on the House, not the federal courts, the power to judge whether its members meet the qualifications for service. If the same reasoning applies to presidential eligibility, then the determination whether McCain, Obama, or any other presidential candidate meets the constitutional requirements would be a nonjusticiable political question.

   Should the same reasoning apply to disputes over presidential qualifications? This depends on a question that I have so far avoided: whether there is some mechanism other than a lawsuit commenced in federal court for resolving the dispute. This question is vital to both the prudential standing and political question inquiries. For prudential standing, as stated in Warth and Newdow, the availability of an alternative mechanism is critical in assessing whether there are “other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the question[].” The political question doctrine, as stated in Baker, similarly turns in part on whether the Constitution commits the matter to “a coordinate political department.” Although these are not the same tests, both of them depend in part on the alternative means by which a party may adjudicate a presidential candidates’ satisfaction of the constitutional requirements—the question to which I now turn.

   III. Alternative Means of Adjudicating Presidential Eligibility
   There are two plausible alternative means by which a party may challenge the eligibility of a presidential candidate. The first is through a statecourt action filed under state election laws, seeking to prevent the election of an ineligible candidate. Conceivably, a party could file such an action either before or after an election, depending on what state law allows. The second possibility is that a member of Congress could challenge the eligibility of a presidential candidate as part of the process by which Congress counts the Electoral College votes. Both of these present, at least in some respects, more satisfactory ways of resolving disputes over presidential eligibility than actions brought in federal court.

   Although the possibility for state-court litigation of a presidential candidate’s eligibility may seem counterintuitive, there is a good reason for believing that this sort of dispute belongs in state court. Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.” In litigation surrounding the 2000 election, Bush’s legal team argued that the Florida Supreme Court violated this provision by failing to follow the Florida legislature’s instructions on post-election proceedings. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore accepted this argument, concluding that the state supreme court’s construction of certain provisions of state election law went beyond the bounds of proper statutory interpretation. Yet none of the Justices disputed that state courts may hear cases alleging violations of state election statutes or that state courts generally possess the power to interpret and enforce those laws.

   State-court litigation might proceed as a lawsuit seeking to keep a presidential candidate off the primary or general election ballot, on the ground that he or she does not satisfy the requisite qualifications. There exists some recent precedent for this type of case. In 2004, supporters of presidential candidate John Kerry brought a number of state-court actions seeking to deny Ralph Nader access to state ballots. In In re Nomination Papers of Nader, for example, registered voters in Pennsylvania filed suit in state court, seeking to have the names of independent candidate Nader and his running mate Peter Camejo excluded from the ballot. As in several other states, the objectors challenged the petition signatures submitted by the Nader-Camejo campaign. In addition, the Pennsylvania objectors argued that Nader and Camejo were not qualified to appear on the general election ballot by virtue of the state’s “sore loser” law, which prohibited candidates from running in a general election after running in state primaries. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that its statute did not in fact justify the exclusion of Nader and Camejo from the ballot, there was no doubt as to the state court’s ability to entertain a challenge to a presidential candidate’s qualifications in the course of determining whether to deny that candidate access to the state ballot.

   It is conceivable that a comparable state-court lawsuit could be filed, in Pennsylvania or another swing state, to challenge a presidential candidate’s constitutional qualifications to serve. There is no requirement that a plaintiff in a state-court lawsuit meet the Article III or prudential requirements for standing. Further, the federal political question doctrine does not bar statecourt litigation seeking to exclude a presidential candidate from the ballot on the ground that he or she is ineligible. It is also conceivable that a statecourt case challenging a presidential candidate’s eligibility could be brought after an election. State law might allow a post-election contest of primary or general election results on the ground that the candidate who gained the most votes does not meet the qualifications for office. A losing presidential candidate could bring a contest petition in state court, seeking an order invalidating the election results if state law allows such a remedy.

   There are obvious reasons why such post-election challenges would be undesirable. As Rick Hasen has argued in Beyond the Margin of Litigation, pre-election litigation is generally preferable to post-election litigation. It is generally better to resolve disputes before an election, allowing problems to be avoided in advance rather than putting courts in the difficult position of cleaning up the mess afterwards. This is particularly true in the context of a challenge to a presidential candidate’s qualifications. In the event that a candidate is deemed ineligible, the party could still put up a substitute.

   Of course, it is up to states—and, in particular, to state legislatures—to define the rights and remedies available in cases where a presidential candidate is alleged to be ineligible. There is certainly no constitutional requirement that the state provide either a pre-election remedy (such as denial of ballot access) or a post-election remedy (like an order invalidating election results) for such disputes. But there remains no constitutional bar to such state-law remedies. In fact, such remedies would seem to fall squarely within what Article II contemplates in leaving it to state legislatures to define the manner by which presidential electors are appointed.

   A downside of such lawsuits is that they could lead to mischief and inconsistency in the state courts. That is particularly true where members of one party or another dominate a state’s highest court. For example, a majority of Florida’s judges were appointed by Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles, and Ohio’s supreme court currently is dominated by elected Republican justices. Suppose that a group of Florida voters brought a state-court action seeking to exclude McCain’s name from that state’s ballot on the ground that he is ineligible to serve. Alternatively, suppose that Ohio voters brought a state lawsuit attempting to knock Obama off the Ohio ballot, alleging that he is ineligible. Suppose further that the state supreme court in either state actually grants the relief requested, excluding the challenged candidate from the ballot on the ground that he is not a natural born citizen. Notwithstanding Article II’s language conferring authority on state legislatures to appoint electors, the prospect of a renegade state court excluding a presidential candidate who is, in fact, qualified is enough to give one pause. It is also possible that state courts in different states could reach conflicting decisions on whether a challenged presidential candidate satisfies the eligibility requirements in Article II.

   Fortunately, there would be an avenue for federal judicial review of such cases. Because the state court’s decision would rest on federal law—in this case Article II’s specification of the requirements to serve as president—the U.S. Supreme Court could hear the case on a petition for writ of certiorari. This is true even if the original state-court action would not have been justiciable in federal court. In ASARCO v. Kadish, for example, the Court held that defendants who lost in state court could obtain U.S. Supreme Court review of federal issues decided against them, even though the original plaintiffs would not have had standing to bring the action in a federal court. The Court held that defendants had standing to seek Supreme Court review on the theory that they had suffered an “injury” by virtue of the adverse state-court judgment against them. For similar reasons, if a candidate were removed from the Florida ballot as part of a state-court action, on the ground that he was constitutionally ineligible to serve as president, that candidate would presumably have standing to seek U.S. Supreme Court review—even if the original plaintiffs (the voters who sought to remove his name from the ballot) would not have had standing to sue in federal court as an initial matter. The prospect of U.S. Supreme Court review provides some assurance against a renegade state court rejecting a candidate who is eligible to be president, and against the possibility of two or more state courts reaching different conclusions on the same presidential candidate’s eligibility.

   There is still a potential objection to Supreme Court review of a statecourt decision excluding or disqualifying a presidential candidate. A court may find that such a case presents a nonjusticiable political question because it is entrusted to another branch of the federal government. To evaluate this question, it is necessary to consider the other plausible option for adjudicating a presidential candidate’s qualifications: Congress making this determination during the process of counting Electoral College votes.

   As I described in a previous First Impressions commentary, the process for counting Electoral College votes is a product of both constitutional and statutory law. The constitutional requirements are set forth in Article II, section 1, as modified by the Twelfth and Twentieth Amendments. In brief, the Constitution provides that the presidential electors, appointed as prescribed by the state legislature, are to meet in their respective states. The Electoral Count Act of 1887 sets the date for their meeting forty-one days after Election Day. The electors then send their votes to “the seat of the government of the United States,” where “the votes shall then be counted.” The person who gains a majority of the electoral votes is elected president. The Electoral Count Act allows states to make objections in writing, if signed by at least one Senator and one member of the House. This act also includes the so-called “safe harbor” date: If state law provides for a final determination of controversies concerning the appointment of electors, and if such determination is made at least six days before the date fixed for the meeting of electors in the states (i.e., 35 days after Election Day, the “safe harbor date”), then Congress is required by statute to respect the state’s decision.

   Does Congress possess the power to adjudicate a dispute over a presidential candidate’s qualifications through this vote-counting process? The answer is not completely clear. On one hand, there is historical precedent for Congress exercising its power not to count electoral votes. In 1873, three of Georgia’s electoral votes cast for Horace Greeley, who died after the November election but before the date the Electoral College met, were not counted. The Senate voted to count those votes while the House voted not to do so and, due to the nonconcurrence of the two chambers, the Greeley votes were not counted under a joint rule. In the event that there is a dispute over a president-elect’s qualifications to serve, it is conceivable that an objection could be made by at least one Senator and one member of the House, which Congress would then have to rule upon. On the other hand, the process of counting the state electors’ votes is, arguably, purely ministerial. This is especially true for states that comply with the safe harbor deadline. As a matter of federal statutory law, those states are entitled to have their electoral votes counted, where controversies are resolved by the safe harbor date.

   Of course, Congress could simply refuse to comply with the safe harbor statute. Suppose, for example, that Colorado is the pivotal state in 2008, that it completes its post-election dispute resolution proceedings by the safe harbor date, and that it timely transmits its list of votes for McCain. Suppose further that Congress refuses to count those votes on the ground that McCain is ineligible and instead counts a competing slate sent by Obama’s electors, in plain violation of the federal safe harbor statute. What then? Would McCain have any legal recourse?

   A candidate in these circumstances would almost surely have Article III standing, as the party most directly injured by Congress’s failure to abide by federal law. The candidate would also have prudential standing, given that he would have suffered a particularized rather than a generalized injury, through its refusal to count the electoral votes to which he was arguably entitled. The big problem is the political question doctrine. The court might deem the question of how to count electoral votes as being entrusted to Congress’s unreviewable discretion, and therefore non-justiciable. It is very difficult to predict whether a federal court would intervene in such a nightmare scenario, particularly given the slipperiness of the political question doctrine. The Twentieth Amendment adds to the confusion. It provides that “if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.” Unfortunately, it does not explicitly say who is to make the determination whether a president elect has “failed to qualify,” and there is little scholarship on the subject. Vasan Kesavan’s article Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional? argues that the Constitution’s structure “suggests that neither the President nor Congress makes these determinations.” It is anyone’s guess, however, whether the Supreme Court would agree or whether it would deem this a nonjusticiable political question.

   The uncertainty over Congress’s power vis-à-vis the federal courts in this sphere magnifies the importance of state courts being open to those challenging a presidential candidate’s qualifications. There is little doubt that state legislatures have the power to define a process to adjudicate a presidential candidate’s qualifications, either through a denial of ballot access or through some type of post-election proceeding. Given the legal uncertainty regarding Congress’s authority not to count the electoral votes of a candidate it believes ineligible, state-court litigation seems like the most appealing path for the resolution of such a dispute, with the possibility of review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Neither standing nor the political question doctrine should serve as a barrier to such review.

   Conclusion
   The current federal lawsuits challenging the presidential candidates’ eligibility to serve as president are not justiciable, and it is questionable whether any justiciable case could be brought in federal court as an initial matter. Fortunately, there are alternative means to adjudicate this matter that are consistent with the U.S. Constitution. The most promising is a preelection state-court lawsuit seeking to keep an allegedly unqualified candidate off the ballot. In the event that a renegade state court rejects a candidate who is, in fact, eligible or that two or more state courts reach conflicting conclusions on a candidate’s eligibility, U.S. Supreme Court review should be available as a backstop. This avenue seems less fraught with peril than congressional resolution of the matter, given Congress’ dubious legal authority to not count electoral votes of a candidate it believes ineligible. Those who seek to challenge a presidential candidate’s eligibility would thus be well-advised to dust off their state election codes and head to state court.

   Senator John McCain and Natural Born Citizenship
   Commentary in this issue:
   – Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship
   – Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause
   – Daniel P. Tokaji, The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?
   – Peter J. Spiro, McCain’s Citizenship and Constitutional Method
   – Stephen E. Sachs, Why John McCain Was a Citizen at Birth
   © Copyright Michigan Law Review, All Rights Reserved.

8. Tanya
   May 24th, 2009 @ 10:05 am

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   SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. – RULES
   ..Part IV. Other Jurisdiction

   Rule 20. Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ

   1. Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U. S. C. §1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised. To justify the granting of any such writ, the petition must show that the writ will be in aid of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court.
   2. A petition seeking a writ authorized by 28 U. S. C. §1651(a), §2241, or §2254(a) shall be prepared in all respects as required by Rules 33 and 34. The petition shall be captioned “In re [name of petitioner]” and shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari prescribed by Rule 14. All contentions in support of the petition shall be included in the petition. The case will be placed on the docket when 40 copies of the petition are filed with the Clerk and the docket fee is paid, except that a petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution, shall file the number of copies required for a petition by such a person under Rule 12.2, together with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a copy of which shall precede and be attached to each copy of the petition. The petition shall be served as required by Rule 29 (subject to subparagraph 4(b) of this Rule).
   3. (a) A petition seeking a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, or both in the alternative shall state the name and office or function of every person against whom relief is sought and shall set out with particularity why the relief sought is not available in any other court. A copy of the judgment with respect to which the writ is sought, including any related opinion, shall be appended to the petition together with any other document essential to understanding the petition.
   (b) The petition shall be served on every party to the proceeding with respect to which relief is sought. Within 30 days after the petition is placed on the docket, a party shall file 40 copies of any brief or briefs in opposition thereto, which shall comply fully with Rule 15. If a party named as a respondent does not wish to respond to the petition, that party may so advise the Clerk and all other parties by letter. All persons served are deemed respondents for all purposes in the proceedings in this Court.
   4. (a) A petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus shall comply with the requirements of 28 U. S. C. §§2241 and 2242, and in particular with the provision in the last paragraph of §2242, which requires a statement of the “reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.” If the relief sought is from the judgment of a state court, the petition shall set out specifically how and where the petitioner has exhausted available remedies in the state courts or otherwise comes within the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §2254(b). To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. This writ is rarely granted.
   (b) Habeas corpus proceedings are ex parte, unless the Court requires the respondent to show cause why the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. A response, if ordered, shall comply fully with Rule 15. Neither the denial of the petition, without more, nor an order of transfer to a district court under the authority of 28 U. S. C. §2241(b), is an adjudication on the merits, and therefore does not preclude further application to another court for the relief sought.
   5. The Clerk will distribute the documents to the Court for its consideration when a brief in opposition under subparagraph 3(b) of this Rule has been filed, when a response under subparagraph 4(b) has been ordered and filed, when the time to file has expired, or when the right to file has been expressly waived.
   6. If the Court orders the case set for argument, the Clerk will notify the parties whether additional briefs are required, when they shall be filed, and, if the case involves a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, that the parties shall prepare a joint appendix in accordance with Rule 26.

9. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
   May 24th, 2009 @ 10:07 am

   there are attorneys looking at it

10. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 24th, 2009 @ 10:08 am

    yes they can

11. Tanya
    May 24th, 2009 @ 10:16 am

    [ Log In ] [ CNDLS Poster Tool Home ] [ Poster Listing]

    Congress’ Power to Set the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction:

    Trends, Dangers, and Recent Developments

    Robert Heberle

    The Consitution and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction

    The Constitution only establishes one federal court: the Supreme Court. All lower federal courts, including appellate courts and district courts, are created and maintained by Congress.

    Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear all cases that the Constitution specifically assigns directly to it. These cases are known as cases of original jurisdiction, and the Court’s ability to hear such cases cannot be restricted. An example of a case of this sort is the ability to hear cases involving foreign ambassadors.

    The other type of jurisdiction the Supreme Court has is called appellate jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is the ability to hear cases brought to the Court from lower courts — usually a federal circuit court or a state supreme court. Unlike original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction may be altered and set by Congress.

    The Supreme Court receives much of its jurisdiction from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. However, most of the Court’s jurisdiction — called appellate jurisdiction — comes from and can be limited by Congress (Photo Courtesy https://www.supremecourtus.gov).

    The fundamental questions to examine in this project closely parallel the issues raised, but only briefly answered, by Weinberg. What is the danger of Congress’ jurisdiction-stripping authority to the Supreme Court and the consitutional system of checks and balances? Has Congress consistently used this power in the past, and is the alarm raised in many academic circles simply, as Weinberg argues, a false alarm?

    The “Article III Box”

    In her article about the potential risks of the use of congressional authority to strip jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, Louise Weinberg makes two novel, and important, arguments. First, she argues that Supreme Court jurisidiction has been routinely altered by Congress throughout American history. Legislation removing jurisdiction from the federal courts under Article III should therefore not raise as much concern as it has been afforded in the academic literature on the subject, Weinberg argues.

    Weinberg also contends that the true threat to the constitutional balance of power is the stripping of jurisdiction from all courts, state and federal. Since Congress has power under Article III only to strip federal courts of jurisdiction, and states will maintian jurisdiction over cases the federal courts can no longer consider, some courts will always maintain appropriate jursidiction over certain issues Congress may not want to be considered.

    Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in its landmark ruling in Ex Parte McCardle (1868) (Photo Courtesy https://www.civil-war.net).

    CASE LAW

    In his article ” Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate,” Gerald Gunther argued that the congressional power to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction was, contrary to many common perceptions, quite significant. Despite the arguments of Weinberg and others, in other words, that the jurisdiction-stripping power is both limited and innocuous, the power of Congress to set Supreme Court jurisidiction is considerable.

    An important focus for Gunther and others is the way in which the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of congressional jurisdiction-stripping in the past. In Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868), the Court upheld a congressional act limiting its jurisidiction over cases of condemned prisoners in the occupied southern states during Reconstruction. McCardle, a pro-southern editor, was sentenced to hang for his dissenting views, which the military government of Mississippi viewed as seditious, treasonous action. McCardle appealed his case to the Supreme Court, which declined to review the case, citing its lack of jurisdiction. Congress had taken away the Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction in such cases; in other words, the Court no longer had the ability to review claims of false imprisonment or punishment in military-occupied zones.

    “What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us,” wrote Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase for the Court. “We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”

    The issue was even earlier addressed in Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307 (1810). In that case, the Court explicitly affirmed the power of Congress to take away its appellate jurisdiction. Critically, the Court also determined that the Constitution, not Congress, gave the original grant of power to the Supreme Court. Thus, congressional acts revoking jurisdiction were removals of preexisting, constitutionally mandated power, rather than eliminations of jurisdiction that had previously been given by Congress to the Court in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first law organizing the federal court system.

    “The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act, but are given by the Constitution,” the Court wrote in Durousseau. The Court’s jurisdiction, however, remains “limited and regulated by that act, and by such other acts as have been passed on the subject.” The constitution did not give Congress absolute power over Supreme Court jurisdiction, it only gave Congress the (still considerable) power “of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”

    ANALYSIS

    This case history implies a less than absolute congressional power over Court jurisdiction. But further analysis affirms such a view even further. Congress faces several obstacles in its pursuit of a reduction of Supreme Court power through jurisdiction-stripping. Let us first consider the nightmare scenario posed by Gunther and many others.

    Congress, with the ability to set federal court jurisdiction, decides to pass a bill flagrantly in violation of the constitution. Imagine, for argument’s sake, a law abolishing the right to speak one’s mind about congressional salaries being too high. Attached to this bill is a provision denying jurisdiction over the legislation to all federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Thus, no First Amendment challenge could (in this scenario) be brought against the law once passed.

    Imagine the difficulties Congress would face in enacting such legislation. Once we consider the issue outside Weinberg’s “Article III box” of thinking, numerous, seemingly insurmountable objects present themselves. A bill in such substantive violation of the constitution would provoke a public outcry of immense proportions. One may imagine a single dictator passing such a law, but getting 218 members of the House and at least 50 senators to agree on a course of action that would, likely jeopardize their electoral futures would be nearly impossible.

    Even if Congress could somehow assemble a majority and pass the bill, despite the slowness of the legislative process and the necessity for consensus and public backing, the president could still veto the bill, requiring the same proponents of the hypothetical legislation to now assemble a two-thirds supermajority in both the House and Senate. Such a majority, usually impossible to achieve on any sort of controversial legislation, would be incredibly difficult to craft and maintain.

    Even then, if the president’s veto were overridden somehow by a two-thirds vote of both houses, state courts could still protect their citizens. As Weinberg emphasizes, state judiciaries have a great deal of leeway in pursuing cases the federal judiciary is no longer able to pursue. State constitutions can be interpreted as protecting the speech of its citizens in cases dealing with congressional salaries. The Supreme Court has recognized a right of states to expand their civil liberties as far as desired, as long as those liberties do not impinge on the federal liberties enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. Only an amendment to the U.S. Constitution could remove this safety net, and such an amendment would require the approval of three-quarters of the states.

    Even in the worst-case scenario, with a renegade Congress and apathetic states that do not want to take extra steps to safeguard their citizens, the Supreme Court has still not recognized the ability of Congress to remove jurisdiction as absolute. Jurisdiction still comes from the Constitution, not the Congress, according to Court precedent (see box at side). It is more than likely, under such circumstances as considered above, that the Supreme Court would step in to declare the provision stripping its jurisdiction unconstitutional (see Weinberg, Meltzer).

    The United States Constitution has much to say about the jurisdiction of federal courts. But does Article III’s grant of congressional power to remove Supreme Court jurisdiction really pose a threat to the separation of powers? (Photo Courtesy https://www.socom.mil).

    RESEARCH PROPOSAL

    The next steps in this research project involve an examination of the history of Article III legislation in Congress and the states. Such a survey would permit an analysis of Weinberg’s proposition that state legislation poses a far greater threat to the consitutional checks and balances and liberties than does congressional action. In essence, such a survey would allow us to determine how many times states have limited state courts (or attempted to limit federal courts) and compare the results to similar congressional action directed against federal courts. The analysis is not only quantitative, but qualitative as well. A main factor in answering the Article III Box dilemma is what types of jurisdiction legislatures are trying to strip courts of. One would assume that closing loopholes in tax jurisdiction would be far less dangerous to the constitutional balance of power than would an attempt to limit courts from considering bills restricting the burning of the flag, for example. Such considerations would have to be taken into account in any further analysis of the subject.

    Works Cited

12. jtx
    May 24th, 2009 @ 11:05 am

    ORLY:

    I’m re-posting this info in case you didn’t see it – but you may already be in contact with “paralegalnm” (Leonard A. Daneman) who has sove hery helpful insights. First his very recent letter to SCOTUS members:

    https://paralegalnm.wordpress.com/2009/05/16/my-letter-to-justices-roberts-scalia-alito-thomas-and-kennedy/

    Next, his highly informative blog:

    https://paralegalnm.wordpress.com/2009/05/16/worldnetdaily-article-interviewing-yours-truly-me/

    Please scan these if you haven’t … Godspeed!!

13. John The American
    May 24th, 2009 @ 11:48 am

    Delay in Russia link
    https://cbs2chicago.com/topstories/Senator.Barack.Obama.2.320724.html

    https://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,167265,00.html

    https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-08-29-senatorsrussiaapology_x.htm

14. pip
    May 24th, 2009 @ 12:41 pm

    Monday, August 29, 2005
    Obama Part of Group Locked Up at Russian Airport

    WASHINGTON, DC — Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) were not allowed to leave a Russian airport Sunday and were locked in a room briefly.

    The incident prevented their departure for about three hours, but Obama told the Sun-Times “it ended up not being a very big deal.”

    Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.)

    The senators had their passports seized by local officials at an airport in Perm. Obama said the officials demanded, unsuccessfully, to inspect the DC-9 military aircraft being used by the congressional delegation for the trip.

    ‘It wasn’t the gulag’

    “We were in a lounge with a locked door at one point,” Obama said. “It wasn’t the gulag.”

    Obama, who will meet with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko today in Kiev, is on his first foreign visit as senator. He said he was never concerned that the group would be taken into custody, because after all, “we are a couple of U.S. senators.”

    Although he was on a first-time diplomatic mission, Obama has traveled extensively, spending part of his youth in Indonesia and visiting Kenya, where his father was born. He noted that as a back- packing college student he had “a lot less leverage than this time.”

    Obama, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Lugar, its chairman, left Wednesday for a trip to inspect sites where nuclear and biological weapons are slated to be destroyed in Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. On Sunday, the U.S. group was scheduled to fly from Perm to Kiev, Ukraine. But border guards wanted proof that the group’s aircraft — which Obama said looked like a “mini-Air Force One” — was really an official U.S. government plane, which would be exempt from an inspection.

    Robert Gibbs, Obama’s spokesman traveling with him, said in an e-mail that “the border guards took our passports and demanded to inspect our aircraft, which we refused. We were moved to a room to wait.”

    “At one point they were demanding to inspect virtually everything, including the gifts their representatives at the missile facility had given us.” The border guard said “they were acting on the authority of the FSB,” the Russian intelligence agency.

    While the delegation waited, there were calls between Washington, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow and the Russian Foreign Ministry, Obama and Gibbs said.

    Obama said local officials at first were not convinced the United States had obtained proper permission for an international flight to depart from Perm.

    ‘Blagojevich of Perm’ helps out

    “The Russian Federation only allows [international] departures from three airports in the country, not from Perm,” Obama said.

    Documentation that the senators had permission “had not trickled down” to Perm, Obama said. He said the matter was resolved with the intervention of the region’s governor, the “Rod Blagojevich of Perm.”

    Source: Chicago Sun-Times
    https://blog.kievukraine.info/2005/08/obama-part-of-group-locked-up-at.html

15. mia
    May 24th, 2009 @ 1:08 pm

    Dr. Orly –

    Thank you for all you have done, for all you are doing, and for all you will continue to do, to save this great nation from its enemies. You will never know how much you are loved and appreciated by so many.

    Trust your own blessed heart and judgment – it’s gotten you farther than anyone else in this travesty of justice. You are working against formidable odds, but I know the good Lord has a plan, and you are an intricate part of that divine plan.

    My prayers are with you.

16. pip
    May 24th, 2009 @ 1:36 pm

    Obama’s adventures in Russia
    permalinke-mail story to a friendprint version10 November, 2008, 04:30

    Russian customs officials seem to have difficulty predicting the next president of the United States – perhaps that’s why they decided it was a good idea to detain Barack Obama in the city of Perm three years ago.

    Obama was on his way to Kiev to meet Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko when officals in the central Russian city seized his passport. Another senator with Obama also had his documents taken and officials demanded to inspect their U.S. military aircraft.

    At one point, Obama recalls, they were locked in a lounge while both sides figured out what to do. The Russian officials did not believe that their plane was U.S. military and said that Obama did not have permission to make an international flight from Perm.

    But the President-elect says that it was not a big deal. “It wasn’t the Gulag,” he said.

    As part of the Open Skies agreement which allows military flights to be made over Russia, international flights can only be made from three cities in Russia. Perm is not included in that group.

    “Documentation of permission had not trickled down to Perm,” Obama said.

    Eventually they were allowed to leave after help from the region’s Governor.

    Obama described the entire incident in his last book, ‘The Audacity of Hope’.

    Local journalist Dmitry Shayko remembers the episode well. He reproduced the incident as part of a cartoon.

    “I’ve shown Obama as a victim,” he said. “Of course I’ve exaggerated the incident for the cartoon genre. Here you can see Obama taking a nap in the departure lounge, and here are Russia’s FSB officials interrogating him. Perhaps, if they’d known he’d become the next U.S. President, they might have treated him with more respect.”

    Dmitry suggests Obama should change the name of his book from ‘The Audacity of Hope’ to ‘The Audacity of Russia’s airport staff’.

    Russia did express regret over the incident at the time, blaming it on a bureaucratic mix-up.

    Shayko said: “The airport security service made up some formal excuses, like they didn’t recognise what kind of plane it was or where it belonged, but how can anyone not recognise it when the plane had huge letters on it saying ‘U.S. Air Force’?”

    Now Russians can read Obama’s account of the story as his latest book has been translated.

    https://www.russiatoday.com/Art_and_Fun/2008-11-10/Obamas_adventures_in_Russia.html

    There is a video on this article on the same webpage

17. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 24th, 2009 @ 2:12 pm

    stay is based on quo warranto 28 usc-1651

18. Alexander Gofen
    May 24th, 2009 @ 2:48 pm

    It is puzzling what it is in fact that scares all of them?

    Dear Dr. Taitz,

    In your recent post you explained why you are focusing now on reaching Justice Souter: “Souter is leaving soon. Souter doesn’t owe anything…”. That is exactly what I miss in your reasoning.

    1. Neither of the 9 justices owe anything or is under pressure of anybody, strictly speaking. They all have life tenures. Nobody can do any harm to them. They risk nothing. Why does neither of 9 wish to take a small risk at least to voice publicly his/her own concerns? (I understand that we need 4 of them to hear the case?

    2. Therefore what difference does it make that Souter is leaving? Why being a retired makes him more wishing to voice his concerns?

    3. More importantly, why does neither of 500 plus US Congressmen wish to voice publicly his/her own concerns? Neither of them will be killed or tortured for that. They risk only some negative media and worsening relationship with the colleagues at most. And some of them were military heros, like Duncan Hunter… What do they all fear?!! They all – while our country is at stake!!!!! This by itself is frightening and abominable…

    4. The same question Re. all the lower level court judges in all those 25 plus court filings that had been dismissed so far. It’s given: some of those judges are corrupt, fearing repercussions, while others hold their sympathy with the impostor. Yet why all 25 of them? What does it say about degradation of our former great American people if not one “modest hero” may be found amongst 500 plus US “representatives”, and among 25 randomly chosen judges, and among other hundreds of the state “representatives”? This is what terrifies and disgust me the most!

    Some conclusion and recommendation. May be folks at local levels know personally which particular local judge still preserved his civil courage and would be ready to actually hear the case? Then somebody must file in the case in that particular jurisdiction. After all, we need at least just one, JUST ONE, actual court hearing issuing the real subpoena!..

    Thank you again for your struggle, which I support from my whole heart wishing to help. May G-d bless and protect you!

    Alexander Gofen

19. WL Hawkins
    May 24th, 2009 @ 3:04 pm

    Have you seen the stealth legislation that could undermine your efforts to expose the usurper? I’m talking about H.R. 985
    https://www.alipac.us/ftopict-157129.html

20. Troublemaker
    May 24th, 2009 @ 4:57 pm

    Key Witness in Obama Passport Fraud Case Murdered
    https://waronyou.com/topics/key-witness-in-obama-passport-fraud-case-murdered/

21. Tanya
    May 24th, 2009 @ 4:59 pm

    Obama’s adventures in Russia
    permalinke-mail story to a friendprint version
    10 November, 2008, 04:30

    Russian customs officials seem to have difficulty predicting the next president of the United States – perhaps that’s why they decided it was a good idea to detain Barack Obama in the city of Perm three years ago.

    Yahoo
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    Obama was on his way to Kiev to meet Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko when officals in the central Russian city seized his passport. Another senator with Obama also had his documents taken and officials demanded to inspect their U.S. military aircraft.

    At one point, Obama recalls, they were locked in a lounge while both sides figured out what to do. The Russian officials did not believe that their plane was U.S. military and said that Obama did not have permission to make an international flight from Perm.

    But the President-elect says that it was not a big deal. “It wasn’t the Gulag,” he said.

    As part of the Open Skies agreement which allows military flights to be made over Russia, international flights can only be made from three cities in Russia. Perm is not included in that group.

    “Documentation of permission had not trickled down to Perm,” Obama said.

    Eventually they were allowed to leave after help from the region’s Governor.

    Obama described the entire incident in his last book, ‘The Audacity of Hope’.

    Local journalist Dmitry Shayko remembers the episode well. He reproduced the incident as part of a cartoon.

    “I’ve shown Obama as a victim,” he said. “Of course I’ve exaggerated the incident for the cartoon genre. Here you can see Obama taking a nap in the departure lounge, and here are Russia’s FSB officials interrogating him. Perhaps, if they’d known he’d become the next U.S. President, they might have treated him with more respect.”

    Dmitry suggests Obama should change the name of his book from ‘The Audacity of Hope’ to ‘The Audacity of Russia’s airport staff’.

    Russia did express regret over the incident at the time, blaming it on a bureaucratic mix-up.

    Shayko said: “The airport security service made up some formal excuses, like they didn’t recognise what kind of plane it was or where it belonged, but how can anyone not recognise it when the plane had huge letters on it saying ‘U.S. Air Force’?”

    Now Russians can read Obama’s account of the story as his latest book has been translated.

22. nationalditzazter
    May 24th, 2009 @ 6:45 pm

    Be the one who frees this country.

    Insist on Justice.

    The People will prevail.

    Constitutional principles will be defended.

    He is not going to last one year.

23. Tanya
    May 24th, 2009 @ 10:31 pm

    States allowed to expand criminal rights
    Wednesday, February 20th, 2008 10:25 am | Lyle Denniston | Print This Post
    Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that states, under their own laws or constitutions, may give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of Supreme Court criminal law decisions, even if the Court itself has ruled they are not retroactive under federal law. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority in Danforth v. Minnesota (06-8273). Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., dissented, joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

    The issue in the case is whether the so-called “Teague” formula (Teague v. Lane) for deciding when a Supreme Court ruling on criminal procedure is to apply to earlier cases was binding on the states. Justice Stevens wrote: “The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not.”

    The case involved the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, barring the admission at trial of out-of-court or pre-trial testimony, if that testimony had not been subjected to cross-examination and the witness could not be called at the trial. The Court, in Whorton v. Bockting in 2007, ruled that the Crawford rule does not apply retroactively; that decision was based on Teague v. Lane.

    A Minnesota prison inmate, Stephen Danforth, serving a 316-month prison sentence for a conviction of sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, claimed that the admission in evidence of a videotape interview with the boy, who did not appear at trial, violated Danforth’s rights under Crawford. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, ruled that federal law governed the retroactivity issue, and that Crawford was not retroactive under the Teague formula. It was while Danforth’s case was pending in the Supreme Court that the Justices decided in Whorton not to apply Crawford to earlier cases. The Court then agreed to hear Danforth’s appeal.

    “A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague,” Justice Stevens wrote, “does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial — only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts. It is fully consistent with a government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may bar relief. It would be quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether constitutional violations occurred in trials conducted before a certain date depends on how much time was required to complete the appellate process.”

    Stevens added: “The states that give broader retroactive effect to this Court’s new rules of criminal procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard. Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state post-conviction proceedings.” Federal law does not prohibit them from doing so, the Court said.

    The case was returned to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a further ruling on whether Danforth is entitled to any legal relief. That will depend upon whether the state’s constitution or laws give defendants in Minnesota the right to retroactive benefit of new criminal procedure decisions.

    Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, said the decision was “contrary to the Supreme Clause and the Framers’ decision to vest in ‘one supreme Court’ the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law.” Citing Marbury v. Madison (1803), the Chief Justice noted that “this Court has held that the question whether a particular ruling is retroactive is itself a question of federal law. It is basic tghat when it cmes to any such question of federal law, it is ‘the province and duty’ of this Court ‘to say what the law is.’….State courts are the final arbiters of their own state law; this Court is the final arbiter of federal law. State courts are therefore bound by our rulings on whether our cases construing federal law are retroactive.”

    ShareThis

    13 Comments »

    This is a Pyrrhic victory for the defense. The Court today accepted my view of Teague as a limitation on the habeas remedy, see 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888, rejected Prof. Liebman’s view that it is a choice-of-law rule, see 98 Colum. L. Rev. 695, and driven multiple nails into the Reynoldsville Casket attack on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

    More on this at Crime and Consequences, here

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — February 20, 2008 @ 12:36 pm

    Editing glitch — should be “drove.”

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — February 20, 2008 @ 12:37 pm

    Kent, do you think that the fact that Stevens wrote this opinion so forcefully and with so much citation to Scalia, means that he thinks that the prudential fight in Kansas v. Marsh over whether to take the case at all has not been settled.

    Comment by Sean O’Brien — February 20, 2008 @ 2:08 pm

    Kent, I think you misrepresent this opinion. Stevens consistently speaks of “post-conviction relief”. He is saying that the action available under 28 USC 2241 is not the same as the action available under Minn. Stat. 590.01 therefore limitations on the first apply to the second only to the extent Minnesota adopts them. The substantive standards of the federal constitution are definitively interpreted by the US Supreme Court, of course, and if a 2241 action will lie pursuant to Teague (and AEDPA), it is futile (and actionable under 1983) for the state to say that its form of post-conviction review does not grant relief based on that constitutional violation (assuming compliance with procedural requirements). (It is this one-way ratchet that Roberts objects to.) Take something like the case we had here in Georgia, where an 18-year-old boy was sentenced to 20 years for having sex with a 15-year-old girl, and afterward a Romeo-and-Juliet law was passed that made sex between a minor and an adult less than 4 years apart a misdemeanor. The sentence was valid when pronounced and could have been sustained on both state and federal post-conviction relief. But under today’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court was also free to say that, for purposes of post-conviction relief, a sentence would be considered excessive under the 8th Amendment if it could not be assessed at the time post-conviction relief was sought. Today’s case does not deal at all with constitutional (what you call suspension-clause) habeas. Suppose the French ambassador is caught soliciting sex in the Minneapolis airport restroom, and, hoping to avoid scandal, he pleads guilty and lets all appellate and post-conviction deadlines pass. The state does not have to provide him a forum, not being bound by Article I, but federal courts must still hear his constitutional habeas claim on the basis that the Minnesota court had no jurisdiction over him.

    Comment by Roger Friedman — February 20, 2008 @ 3:05 pm

    The tone and demeanor of the dissent in this case suggests to me that Chief Justice Roberts and Kennedy have voted not to exclude the evidence in Virginia v. Moore. While of course the cases are distinguishable, Roberts and Kennedy seem to be prsctically horrified by a prospect of allowing the practical effect of federal law to differ from state to state: in this case concerning the remedy, and in Moore concerning the exclusion of evidence from an arrest permitted by federal law.

    Comment by Jacob Berlove — February 20, 2008 @ 3:36 pm

    When you unpack everything Teague and the AEDPA standard are simply res judicata/full faith and credit issues, i.e., how much res judicata effect will the prior state judgment be given. That stuff is wholly inapplicable to what res judicata effect a state court gives a state court judgment.

    Did I miss something?

    Comment by Sean O’Brien — February 20, 2008 @ 3:48 pm

    Roger, first you state that I misrepresent the opinion but then you go off on a tangent that has nothing to do with my comment. Neither your Georgia example nor your jurisdictional challenge example are inconsistent with my view that Congress can constitutionally require federal courts to let judgments of state courts of competent jurisdiction stand when they are collaterally attacked over disagreements on close questions. Today’s opinion reinforces an important pillar of that argument. Teague’s status as limit on the habeas remedy confirms that the remedy can be selectively limited to those cases where Congress (or the Court in the absence of direction from Congress) thinks the benefit is worth the cost.

    For what it’s worth, Congress could deny federal habeas jurisdiction to a state prisoner claiming diplomatic immunity, and the First Congress did. See Ex parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964 (1805).

    Sean, it could be that Scalia needed some persuading. At oral argument he seemed to be going over to the view of retroactivity as a substantive rule rather than a limit on a remedy. I’m glad to see that he didn’t go that way in the end.

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — February 20, 2008 @ 3:50 pm

    “Sean, it could be that Scalia needed some persuading. At oral argument he seemed to be going over to the view of retroactivity as a substantive rule rather than a limit on a remedy. I’m glad to see that he didn’t go that way in the end”

    Kent, I think you’re spot on. From the oral argument, i didn’t think the court would agree with Justice Stevens. ( At least not Justice Scalia,Thomas,or Alito) While most of the opinion quoted quite a bit Scalia, it was indicative from the oral argument how Stevens would write this case whether he was in the majority or the dissent.

    In fact, this opinions for this case, sounded pretty much what was covered in the oral argument. Stevens adamant about the difference between right & remedy. Kennedy and Roberts both fiercely believing that SCOTUS gets the last say on retroactivity.

    The real suspense for me is how did Stevens get Scalia, Thomas and Alito to sign his rather than Roberts’ opinion given what happened in the oral argument!

    Comment by Chee Foong Chew — February 20, 2008 @ 4:22 pm

    Stevens’ positions in Kansas v. Marsh and this case have some parallels, although the two cases are obviously distinguishable.

    I still fail to see how Roberts dissent can overcome the fact that the res judicata effect of a prior state court decision on subsequent state court proceeding is a state law issue.

    It was great to see how the Teague rule was explicitly tied to statutory language “as law and justice require”. This, as Kent points out, strengthens the view that AEDPA is a valid exercise of Congressional power.

    Comment by Sean O’Brien — February 20, 2008 @ 5:05 pm

    Kent:

    In the early days, state courts issued habeas writs on behalf of persons in federal custody. Stevens’ history of federal habeas starts with an 1830 decision and picks up during the Civil War, when of course federal supremacy was the issue.

    Here you claim victory on the basis that Teague is described as a limitation on the “habeas remedy” rather than “choice of law”, while on your website you claim this is relevant to constitutional habeas. Stevens’ discussion at 13 and n.15 makes it clear that he is talking about the statutory action. “Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts.” Nor, equally, on constitutional habeas. The writ of habeas corpus emitting from the statutory action is no more like that emitting from the constitutional action or like that emitting from a state action than it is like habeas corpus ad testificandum.

    My two examples showed that state and federal courts can apply the same constitutional law with different results due to different conceptions of how post-conviction relief works (Georgia) and that constitutional habeas and 2241 are not necessarily coextensive (immunity). I’m sorry if their relevance or obviousness didn’t seem as clear to you as to me.

    Comment by Roger Friedman — February 20, 2008 @ 6:21 pm

    “…while on your website you claim this is relevant to constitutional habeas.”

    If by “constitutional habeas” you mean habeas as required by the Suspension Clause, the only point in today’s decision relevant to that question is the Court’s acknowledgment that common law habeas (and therefore the Suspension Clause) was limited to jurisdictional questions. That was once a furious historical debate, but it’s largely over, and the Fay v. Noia revisionism lies in ruins.

    The primary debate over § 2254(d)– the one in the two law review articles I cited in the beginning and the one before the Ninth Circuit in Irons v. Carey — is all about the statutory writ and whether Congress can, consistently with Article III, require “deference” (actually a limited form of res judicata) to state court judgments in a class of cases where Congress could repeal the jurisdiction entirely if it chose. Today’s holding on the nature of the Teague rule is highly relevant to that debate, as I explained in comment 7, above.

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — February 20, 2008 @ 7:21 pm

    I am not an attorney and thus obviously do not understand the merits of this case, however I am the very proud Father in Law of Ben Butler, the young lawyer who argued this case for the Defense.

    Winning 7 – 2 seems very impressive to me for sure. Way to go Ben! I didn’t get to see Ben in action as I had the best job of babysitting Caroline, Ben & Katherines 3 1/2 year old while they were in Washington. So in effect, we both won. Love you all! Dad, Denny, Grandpa Ohio

    Comment by Dennis D Stafford — February 21, 2008 @ 6:44 am

    The argument that Danforth strengthens the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) is based on a skewed reading of the opinion which does not account for the fact that it was written by Justice Stevens — who, in Williams v. Taylor, wanted to construe section 2254(d)(1) in a manner so as to avoid constitutional problems. I, instead, believe that Danforth undermines the section 2254(d)(1)’s constitutionality.

    Danforth’s holding is very simple: The Teague doctrine does not constrain the authority of a state court to give retroactive effect to a new rule of federal constitutional law on state collateral attacks even when the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such a new rule will not be given retroactive effect on federal habeas review.

    Who does Danforth help: It helps the criminal defense bar and those who seek expansion of rights under state constitutions and state law. If the Supreme Court is going to give retroactive effect to a new rule under Teague, that retroactive effect must automatically be applied on state and federal habeas review. If, however, the Supreme Court is not going to provide retroactive effect on federal habeas review, the state court is allowed to provide retroactive effect to the U.S. Supreme Court decision under Danforth.

    Danforth undermines 2254’s constitutionality because it is yet another opinion by Justice Stevens which makes it more plausible to hold that a state prisoner’s “right” to seek federal habeas review is not merely a statutory one — it is a constitutional one, or in the alternative, the statutory right is constitutionally compelled by the Suspension Clause. Section II of Justice Stevens’s opinion notes that although it was the 1867 statute which gave federal courts jurisdiction over habeas petitions from state prisoners, jurisdiction over these petitions was unnecessary prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal review of state convictions prior to the Fourteenth Amendment was unnecessary as persons convicted in state court did not enjoy the protections of the Bill of Rights. Since the writ of habeas corpus had existed as a common law right for about 400 years prior to 1867, its potential for the review of state convictions in federal court was only realized when state prisoners can were given an opportunity — vis-a-vis the Fourteenth Amendment — to claim violations of such rights in state courts by filing habeas petitions in federal courts. I would argue that Congress understood in 1867 that it must, under the Suspension Clause, provide state prisoners a right to petition the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.

    The argument for for section 2254’s unconstitutionality is obviously stronger if the right of a state prisoner to seek federal habeas review is constitutional rather than statutory. Although Justice Stevens has never held such, by reading his opinion in Rasul v. Bush (section 2241 petitions) and Williams v. Taylor (in which he interpreted section 2254 in a manner so as to avoid constitutional problems — whereas Justice O’Connor did otherwise) in conjunction with section II of Danforth, it appears that he believes that a state prisoner has a constitutional right to seek habeas relief from a federal court.

    A reading of Marbury v. Madison which would only extend the court’s judicial review power to say what the law is and not deny force and effect to unconstitutional state court decisions undermines both judicial review and the Supremacy clause of the Constitution. As Professor Monaghan has summarized it: “There is no half-way position in constitutional cases; so long as it is directed to decide the case, an article III court cannot be ‘jurisdictionally’ shut off from full consideration of the substantive constitutional issues, at least absent adequate opportunity for consideration of those claims in another article III tribunal.”

    As then-Judge and now Justice Kennedy explained: “If the essential, constitutional role of the judiciary is to be maintained, there must be both the appearance and the reality of control by Article III judges over the interpretation, declaration, and application of federal law.” Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

    Although it is not relevant to the point being made here, Danforth’s holding raises two more problems which the Danforth majority did not anticipate: (1) What happens if the state court gives retroactive effect to a new rule on state habeas reveiw (to which the U.S. Supreme Court has not given retroactive effect on federal habeas review) and misapplies the rule. Can the petitioner seek federal habeas review and argue that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court when the Supreme Court had earlier decided to not give retroactive effect to the rule? (2) What happens if the Minnesota Supreme Court, when giving retroactive effect to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) pursuant to the holding in Danforth, narrows the application of Crawford on state collateral review? Can the petitioner go to a federal district court and argue that the Minnesota state court narrowly applied Crawford on state habeas review when the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to give Crawford retroactive effect on federal habeas review.

24. Michael
    May 24th, 2009 @ 11:00 pm

    Orly,
    Regarding the interpretation of Hawaiian Statute, as to what is acceptable as a birth certificate.

    Here is an abstract from a forum where I argue that a COLB is not considered the ‘same as the original’

    https://forum09.faithfreedom.org/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=206&start=2180

    THHuxley wrote:

    piggy wrote:Even the relevant Hawaiian Statute excludes a COLB (part thereof) as being the same as the original ………. this has been proven earlier in this thread already

    Piggy lie #3

    The relevant Hawaiian Statute declares it to be “considered for all purposes the same as the original.”

    piggy replies: The COLB (‘B’ see below) ……… aka ‘a part thereof’ is excluded from being ‘considered for all purposes the same as the original’

    The ONLY items that are ‘considered for all purposes the same as the original’ are (A) ‘a certified copy of any certificate’ and (B) ‘the contents of any certificate’.

    NONE of these are a (C) aka a COLB.

    (A) doesn’t need to be specifically mentioned as being ‘considered for all purposes the same as the original’ because it would be an image copy and goes without saying that it is the same as the original.

    (C) does not get a mention in the section (b) of the statute.

    Read and see for yourself ……… (item markings A, B & C by me)

    §338-13 Certified copies. (a) Subject to the requirements of sections 338-16, 338-17, and 338-18, the department of health shall, upon request, furnish to any applicant (A) a certified copy of any certificate, or (B)the contents of any certificate, or (C)any part thereof.

    (b) Copies of the contents (B) of any certificate on file in the department, certified by the department shall be considered for all purposes the same as the original, subject to the requirements of sections 338-16, 338-17, and 338-18.

    (c) Copies may be made by photography, dry copy reproduction, typing, computer printout or other process approved by the director of health. [L 1949, c 327, §17; RL 1955, §57-16; am L Sp 1959 2d, c 1, §19; HRS §338-13; am L 1978, c 49, §1]

25. Elisabeth
    May 24th, 2009 @ 11:12 pm

    Alexander Gofen:

    “It is puzzling what it is in fact that scares all of them? ”
    “Neither of the 9 justices owe anything or is under pressure of anybody, strictly speaking. They all have life tenures. Nobody can do any harm to them. They risk nothing. Why does neither of 9 wish to take a small risk at least to voice publicly his/her own concerns? (I understand that we need 4 of them to hear the case?”

    Maybe death threats?? Obama & Biden had a closed door meeting with all but one of the Supreme Court Justices (I believe missing was Alito)
    Beside the fact that the meeting was against the law due to Orly’s lawsuit on the docket, what do you think they met about? One can only guess!

    **Don’t you remember all the deaths surrounding the Clinton White House??? It’s happening again…Kellerman from Freddie Mac, the young witness to the passport tampering case, Mark Levy…..there’s probably more.

    This came from http://www.repubx.com which is also called Defend Our Freedoms Foundation and I’m unsure the connection with Orly if there is one. Anyway, his blog has “tons” of informtion that you won’t hear on the news….he definitely gets around and I think he’s on the up and up.

    FSB: Justice Souter forced to resign over his refusing an order from Chief Justice John Roberts to support the implementation of Martial Law within the US planned for this coming fall
    by DefendUSx May 13, 2009 00:04

    Well, we sure won’t here this from the White House or Souter himself how it really went down. An “apparent suicide” may not be what he has in mind for his early retirement, from what is otherwise usually a life-long postion in the Supreme Court.

    Souter was a very strong advocate for “individual liberties”.

    The information in this article comes translated from the FSB, formly known as the KGB. They have eyes and ears most everywhere, just like the US intel agencies do. The FSB is the equivalent to the NSA (National Security Agency) here in the states.

    This has already been propagated around the Internet to some extent, easy to find if you know where to look. Intelligence sites are very good resources for getting closer to the truth and taking the ‘spin’ out of the media propaganda machine.

    FSB reported to the Kremlin that United States Supreme Court Justice David Souter was forced to resign over his refusing an order from Bush-appointed Chief Justice John Roberts to support the planned implementation of Martial Law within the US planned for this coming fall due to the combining of the current H1N1 Swine Flu virus with the H5N1 Avian Flu.

    * Northeastern Intelligence is reporting this very same thing about the Avian Flu coming soon and Martial Law going along with it

    According to these reports, Justice Souter, Justice Ruth Ginsberg and Justice Samuel Alito were all refusing Chief Justice Roberts orders, a protégé of Justice Alito, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General under President Clinton, and head of fundraising for Hillary Clinton’s failed presidential bid, Mark Levy, was “suicided” prompting Justice Souter’s immediate resignation.

    Attorney Mark Levy, these reports continue, was a classmate of the former President Clinton and his wife Hillary at Yale and was actively working with Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Alito in preparing a US Supreme Court challenge to the planned implementation of Martial Law and was an experienced litigator before America’s highest court having argued 16 prior cases before them.

    On the apparent suicide of Levy by those forces supporting Martial Law, the Washington Post, known by the FSB as the “CIA’s mouthpiece”, reports that Levy’s shooting a bullet through his head was due to has having been laid off from his job at the prestigious Kilpatrick Stockton law firm, but which these reports state is “ludicrous” as Levy and his family are worth tens-of-millions of dollars and his vast connections within Washington D.C. through the Clinton’s and Usurper Obama “assured” his place as one of the United States top legal workers for decades to come.

    What is most surprising about all of these events though is how utterly clueless the American people are as to what is happening around them, which becomes even more astounding when viewed in the light of past historical events that clearly show the machinations the elite Western banking class use in pushing forth their agenda for a New World Order, and which include, Global Economic Collapse, Global Pandemic and Global War.

    Even worse, these deluded Americans continue to rely upon their propaganda media organs for information that even the most cursory of research shows is nearly all total lies being told to keep them from knowing, and acting on the truth.
    *********************************************

    I had an idea…..I have an automatic signature on my emails that I send out. I now have this on the bottom of each of my emails:

    **Where’s Obama’s Birth Certificate? Find out more information at Defend Our Freedom Foundation https://www.orlytaitzesq.com/blog1**

26. FreedomForUS
    May 25th, 2009 @ 12:48 am

    This is not directly related, but I had to share with all of you. Rachel Maddow is a MSNBC show. She ripped the whole notion that Obama hasn’t shown his birth certificate and those who think he wasn’t born in the U.S.

    HOWEVER, it appears that eyes are being opened to the counterfeit message of Mr. Obama. I was stunned when I listened to this story…both to Mr. Obama’s plan, but also that a MSNBC “reporter” is bring it to light.

    [url]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBHnOiBJEjk[/url]

    Perhaps, she might be more willing to listen to a respectful letter about Mr. Obama citizenship. Keep praying everyone, more than ever!

27. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 1:25 am

    Tanya, thank you for your help.

28. 1 Little Injun
    May 25th, 2009 @ 1:52 am

    Orl, You may find Army Regulation 381-12 of some standing help in military cases.

29. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 1:58 am

    what does 381 say?

30. 1 Little Injun
    May 25th, 2009 @ 2:02 am

    Chapter 3 is of some interest as this “Reporting of incidets and situations in this paragraph is mandatory.” get someone to look it over!

31. 1 Little Injun
    May 25th, 2009 @ 2:06 am

    Ammy Reg 381-12 Military Intelligence

    Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S.Army(SAEDA)

32. 1 Little Injun
    May 25th, 2009 @ 2:12 am

    Please yo’ll, Rember those who freely gave all. God Bless

33. Cody Judy
    May 25th, 2009 @ 3:28 am

    Another area to research, is what exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of court’s exceptional powers, why adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. I believe I’ve written a lot on this one, but additional info is welcome.

    Thank you for your work Orly and I respect your dedication to the matter at hand. I want to express the importance I believe in bringing all together that you can. For example, one mistake I believe Mr. Berg made was forgetting to bring “help along” in more ways then one. Let me explain.

    I had submitted an “Amicus Curia” to the Court in favor of Berg, but realized that it had to be presented by an attorney qualified to submit to the SOTUS to be registered on the docket. Berg’s assistant, Lisa, had John a practicing SCOTUS Esq. contact me, and had been forwarded my Amicus Curia online, as it’s on my web site. http://www.codyjudy.us

    Berg’s case came up for REVIEW, and John had not submitted my Amicus Curia and as we know his case was denied.

    One reason this is important is that it shows more than one attorney, on the case, more then one person’s interest, more than one hero so to speak. Without sounding condescending, to anyone who has worked so hard and given time (life) and fortune (money), as our Forefathers did so historically to pouding out and forging our Constitution, I believe you have done a great job in gaining some ground with military personal, and some legislatures, which you have represented in this cause, however, as the case seems thus far, both you and Berg, have done little to sure up maybe what I’d call your “back up” or “full chess” board.

    Maybe the “ponds” are not important, but who wants to go against the other person without any? Who want’s to give up a “horse” or a “bishop” or a “castle” to start the game? Now let me relate how I believe perhaps my case against “John McCain” could help you now.

    #1) I ran for President – More ‘STANDING’ as far as the “Direct Harm” issue. I spent my own money just like McCain and Obama did. While you have Allan Keys who filed with you against Obama as a Presidential Candidate, you lack a Candidate who filed against McCain, I did. What this does is brings “The Elephants” into your court. Open that flood gate and you could get alot more sympathy from conservative Justices, concerned about picking on “Obama” and starting a race war of civil unrest that could scar America much more then ignoring the issue. If the Justices and America see’s the racial card played, evan if it appears to be played, your in trouble with the Justices.

    As I understand, I was the ONLY one who filed against McCain and you can read my case on my web site, as well as the Amicus Curia, which Berg’s failed to help get me into contact with an practicing SCOTUS Esq. fast enough to help. I think “Ego” starts playing the lot with this “issue” and fighting for some 350 million Americans, and wanting to be the “Saving Attorney” and well, I’m sure you realize the WND Petititon got more attention with Scalia, then say one attorney.

    Now, how this relates to getting the SCOTUS to hear us with a ‘FULL COURT”… well, my case was filed in ‘NEVADA’, and was dismissed basically on a “moot” charge. In other words, my Judge didn’t dismiss my case because I didn’t have standing, but because Obama won. One leg of criteria of standing is showing a direct cause that could have been altered if the Constitution had been applied retrospectively and the outcome significantly “changing the course of events”.

    My argument was, I did have standing, if McCain representing ALL REPUBLICANS, conservatives in America, had been banned from running, (and my law suit was served 4 days BEFORE his nomination), a couple of things might have transpired. #1) I would have got instant press as having been the Presidential Contestant who got McCain out, the American People would have been notified, and I liked my chances against Obama having a conservative platform. Also, think about Sarah Palin? Republicans could have been forced to abandon McCain and the Deligates could of had a chance to change as well as the electorate change votes of McCain, which could have changed the course of the election as the first Republican women nominee for Republicans!

    That is a plausible argument, but YOU HAVE TO HAVE a Presidential Contestant who had standing who sued McCain, to bring that argument into the SCOTUS Conscience, and I believe you have been lacking a ‘POLITICAL’ argument, as well as a Constitutional argument. This could help.

    Also, as many states as possible… you have been working on gettting more legislatures and military personal from all states. SCOTUS JUSTICES can only be encouraged to hear the case if they see ‘STATE BOUNDRIES’ crossed. My case being from NEVADA, yours from CALIFORNIA, ect. Now, the SCOTUS gains a position that they have all these cases coming in from all over the NATION, and they just as well hear them ALL in one, rather then wasting time of the SCOTUS court and Clerks wondering through all of them. I have also had another case submitted to the Supreme Court which didn’t get chosen as a case they heard not on the basis of ‘LEGITAMACY of ISSUE, but rather the basis that it didn’t affect to many people ( even though it was a constitutional issue of the right to evidence in your ability to defend yourself, and it certainly would affect anyone being framed by A.G’s) the court only see’s so many cases a year, and if your’s isn’t chosen, so sorry Charlie.

    So, I know it is VERY important to show your case affecting many many cases, and crossing state lines, may bring a “Commerce Clause” into the equasion of being heard and the SCOTUS having direct jurisdiction, just as the Fed’s want to control commerce going into one state to another. Glenn Beck did a whole show related to the Fed’s controlling commerce going over state lines.. this issue needs to be shown having crossed state boundries, which put’s the SCOTUS in a direct jurisdiction in another way.

    Some idea’s for your consideration.. thank you again for your effort.

    Cody Judy
    http://www.codyjudy.us
    codyjudy@hotmail.com

34. Denise Hoagland
    May 25th, 2009 @ 7:20 am

    I found this quite disturbing this morning. This is from WorldNetDaily. After a line of X’s I have posted the bill as it has passed the House.

    ——————————————————————————–

    ——————————————————————————–
    BORN IN THE USA?
    Revealed: ‘The Obama birth certificate protection act’?
    Bill would prohibit compelling executive branch from releasing documents

    ——————————————————————————–
    Posted: May 24, 2009
    9:12 pm Eastern

    © 2009 WorldNetDaily

    Barack Obama, the man elected president

    WASHINGTON – A bill approved by the House of Representatives and referred to the Senate would prohibit federal employees of executive branch from being compelled to release any document unless a court makes a specified determination by a preponderance of evidence – legislation at least one group suspects is designed to protect Barack Obama’s elusive birth certificate from release.

    The legislation, HR 985, resides in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

    Sovereignty Alliance has issued a “red alert” about the bill it calls “stealth legislation … to protect Obama from providing his birth certificate.”

    XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

    ——————————————————————————–
    Free Flow of Information Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

    HR 985 EH

    111th CONGRESS

    1st Session

    H. R. 985

    ——————————————————————————–

    AN ACT
    To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected with the news media.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

    SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the `Free Flow of Information Act of 2009′.

    SEC. 2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COVERED PERSONS.

    (a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure- In any matter arising under Federal law, a Federal entity may not compel a covered person to provide testimony or produce any document related to information obtained or created by such covered person as part of engaging in journalism, unless a court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to such covered person–

    (1) that the party seeking to compel production of such testimony or document has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources (other than the covered person) of the testimony or document;

    (2) that–

    (A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information obtained from a person other than the covered person–

    (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred; and

    (ii) the testimony or document sought is critical to the investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution; or

    (B) in a matter other than a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information obtained from a person other than the covered person, the testimony or document sought is critical to the successful completion of the matter;

    (3) in the case that the testimony or document sought could reveal the identity of a source of information or include any information that could reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of the identity of such a source, that–

    (A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of terrorism against the United States or its allies or other significant and specified harm to national security with the objective to prevent such harm;

    (B) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm with the objective to prevent such death or harm, respectively;

    (C) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to identify a person who has disclosed–

    (i) a trade secret, actionable under section 1831 or 1832 of title 18, United States Code;

    (ii) individually identifiable health information, as such term is defined in section 1171(6) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d(6)), actionable under Federal law; or

    (iii) nonpublic personal information, as such term is defined in section 509(4) of the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809(4)), of any consumer actionable under Federal law; or

    (D)(i) disclosure of the identity of such a source is essential to identify in a criminal investigation or prosecution a person who without authorization disclosed properly classified information and who at the time of such disclosure had authorized access to such information; and

    (ii) such unauthorized disclosure has caused or will cause significant and articulable harm to the national security; and

    (4) that the public interest in compelling disclosure of the information or document involved outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.

    (b) Authority To Consider National Security Interest- For purposes of making a determination under subsection (a)(4), a court may consider the extent of any harm to national security.

    (c) Limitations on Content of Information- The content of any testimony or document that is compelled under subsection (a) shall–

    (1) not be overbroad, unreasonable, or oppressive and, as appropriate, be limited to the purpose of verifying published information or describing any surrounding circumstances relevant to the accuracy of such published information; and

    (2) be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time covered so as to avoid compelling production of peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.

    (d) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this Act shall be construed as applying to civil defamation, slander, or libel claims or defenses under State law, regardless of whether or not such claims or defenses, respectively, are raised in a State or Federal court.

    (e) Exception Relating to Criminal or Tortious Conduct- The provisions of this section shall not prohibit or otherwise limit a Federal entity in any matter arising under Federal law from compelling a covered person to disclose any information, record, document, or item obtained as the result of the eyewitness observation by the covered person of alleged criminal conduct or as the result of the commission of alleged criminal or tortious conduct by the covered person, including any physical evidence or visual or audio recording of the conduct, if a Federal court determines that the party seeking to compel such disclosure has exhausted all other reasonable efforts to obtain the information, record, document, or item, respectively, from alternative sources. The previous sentence shall not apply, and subsections (a) and (b) shall apply, in the case that the alleged criminal conduct observed by the covered person or the alleged criminal or tortious conduct committed by the covered person is the act of transmitting or communicating the information, record, document, or item sought for disclosure.

    SEC. 3. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS.

    (a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure- With respect to testimony or any document consisting of any record, information, or other communication that relates to a business transaction between a communications service provider and a covered person, section 2 shall apply to such testimony or document if sought from the communications service provider in the same manner that such section applies to any testimony or document sought from a covered person.

    (b) Notice and Opportunity Provided to Covered Persons- A court may compel the testimony or disclosure of a document under this section only after the party seeking such a document provides the covered person who is a party to the business transaction described in subsection (a)–

    (1) notice of the subpoena or other compulsory request for such testimony or disclosure from the communications service provider not later than the time at which such subpoena or request is issued to the communications service provider; and

    (2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before the time at which the testimony or disclosure is compelled.

    (c) Exception to Notice Requirement- Notice under subsection (b)(1) may be delayed only if the court involved determines by clear and convincing evidence that such notice would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal investigation.

    SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:

    (1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER- The term `communications service provider’–

    (A) means any person that transmits information of the customer’s choosing by electronic means; and

    (B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an information service provider, an interactive computer service provider, and an information content provider (as such terms are defined in sections 3 and 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153, 230)).

    (2) COVERED PERSON- The term `covered person’ means a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information that concerns local, national, or international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain and includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such covered person. Such term shall not include–

    (A) any person who is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as such terms are defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801);

    (B) any organization designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);

    (C) any person included on the Annex to Executive Order No. 13224, of September 23, 2001, and any other person identified under section 1 of that Executive order whose property and interests in property are blocked by that section;

    (D) any person who is a specially designated terrorist, as that term is defined in section 595.311 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor thereto); or

    (E) any terrorist organization, as that term is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)).

    (3) DOCUMENT- The term `document’ means writings, recordings, and photographs, as those terms are defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 (28 U.S.C. App.).

    (4) FEDERAL ENTITY- The term `Federal entity’ means an entity or employee of the judicial or executive branch or an administrative agency of the Federal Government with the power to issue a subpoena or issue other compulsory process.

    (5) JOURNALISM- The term `journalism’ means the gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of news or information that concerns local, national, or international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.
    Passed the House of Representatives March 31, 2009.

    Attest:

    Clerk.

    111th CONGRESS

    1st Session

    H. R. 985

    AN ACT
    To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected with the news media.

35. Marcelo S. Willett
    May 25th, 2009 @ 7:29 am

    Dr. Orly,

    In regards to FreedomForUS says:

    Obama contradicts himself correct link is>

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBHnOiBJEjk

36. ms. helga
    May 25th, 2009 @ 8:08 am

    THE DEMOCRAT PARTY’S MANIFESTO – Read # 31
    1. You have to believe the AIDS virus is spread by lack of Federal funding.
    2. You have to believe that the school system that can’t teach a fourth grader how to read is some how the best qualified to teach those same children all about sex.
    3. You have to believe that guns, in the hands of law abiding Americans, are more of a threat than U.S. nuclear weapons technology in the hands of Chinese communists.
    4. You have to believe there was no art before Federal funding.
    5. You have to believe that global temperatures are less affected by cyclical, documented changes in the earth’s climate, and more affected by Americans driving SUVs.
    6. You have to believe that gender roles are artificial, but being homosexual is natural.
    7. You have to be against capital punishment but support abortion on demand.
    8. You have to believe that business creates oppression and governments create prosperity.
    9. You have to believe that hunters don’t care about nature, but loony activists from Seattle do.
    10. You have to believe that self-esteem is more important than actually doing something to earn it.
    11. You have to believe that the U.S. Military, not evil and tyrannical regimes, start wars.
    12. You have to=2 0be lieve the NRA is bad because it supports c ertain parts of the Constitu tion, while the ACLU is good because it supports certain part s of the Constitution.
    13. You have to believe that taxes are too low, but ATM fees are too high.
    14. You have to believe that Margaret Sanger and Gloria Steinem are more important to American history than Thomas Jefferson, General Robert E. Lee, or Thomas Edison.
    15. You have to believe that standardized tests are racist, but racial quotas and set-asides are not.
    16. You have to believe Hillary Clinton is all about “progress” and not power. She just wants to help us out of the archaic system of governing that we have been subjected to since our founding.
    17. You have to believe that the only reason socialism hasn’t worked anywhere it’s been tried, is because the right people haven’t been in charge. (I’ve got news for you. It has never worked because the RIGHT people have been in charge.)
    18. You have to believe Republicans telling the truth belong in jail, but a cheat, liar and sex offender belongs in the White House and you would vote him back in there in a New York Minute (if you could).
    19. You have to believe that homosexual parades displaying drag, transvestites, and bestiality should be constitutionally protected, and manger scenes at Christmas should be illegal.
    20. You have to believe that illegal Democrat Party funding by the Chinese is somehow in the best interest of the United States.
    21. You have to believe that the vociferous minorities who protest against prayer and saluting the flag in school h ave far more rights than the majority who believe in God and country, and want these values instilled in our young children.
    22. You have to believe in MOB RULE and not RULING THE MOB (The Republican way).
    23. You must not listen to Rush Limbaugh.
    24 Trade Unions and Trial Lawyers are our strength and power.
    25 The Main Stream Media and Hollywood are our propagandists.
    26- FEMINISTS and GAYS are the men of our party.
    27- The Terri Schiavo case proves we and a two-timing husband have more power than GOD and 2 loving parents.
    28- WE HAVE TO CUT & RUN FROM IRAQ BECAUSE IF
    THE U.S. HELPS THEM WIN – WE LOSE.
    29- WE AND THE MAIN STREAM MEDIA MUST NEVER LET THE TRUTH
    ABOUT TWA FLIGHT 800 (www.cashill.com) AND THE ARKANSAS PRISON TO CANADA BLOOD SCANDAL ( https://www.factor8movie.com) TO GET OUT TO RUIN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.
    30 – Remember what our Uncle=2 0Joe Stalin said-”It’s not who votes that counts, it’s who counts the votes”
    31 – Our success will be realized when we are able to place an unconstitutional and ineligible candidate into the Whitehouse, causing our enemies to change the name of Washington, DC to USURPERVILLE(Google it up)
    .
    32- LAST BUT NOT LEAST WE ARE THE PARTY FOR THE LOSERS IN
    LIFE AND WE(The Elitists -ie-
    Kerry or Soros) CAN ONLY KEEP OUR POWER BY KEEPING THEM
    THERE.
    32- You have to swear to the : THE DEVIL’S CODE
    HIS HEART DOES NOT EXIST
    HE SPEAKETH WITH A FORKED TONGUE
    HIS STRENGTH UPHOLDS THE WICKED
    HIS SWORD SLAYS THE DEFENSELESS
    HIS WRATH UNDOES THE INNOCENT
    ‘
    BUT NOT TO THE: THE KNIGHT’S CODE
    HIS HEART KNOWS VIRTUE
    HIS TONGUE SPEAKS ONLY TRUTH
    HIS STRENGTH UPHOLDS THE WEAK
    HIS SWORD DEFENDS THE HELPLESS
    HIS WRATH UNDOES THE WICKED
    THIS WAS THE OATH OF A FIGHTER PILOT. Keep forwarding and add more
    PS-THE COWBOY AND FIGHTER PILOT IS AMERICA’S VERSION OF OLD EUROPE’S CHIVALRY AND KNIGHTHOOD.
    PSS – BOBBY KENNEDY WAS KILLED B Y SIRHAN SIRHAN A PALESTINIAN AND POPE JOHN PAUL WAS ATTEMPTED TO BE KILLED BY ALI MEHMET AGCA A TURKISH MUSLIM. THIS STARTED IN 1968. HOW SOON WE FORGET

    Send this to 1000 Friends or 1000 times to One Enemy.

37. Jack Ryan
    May 25th, 2009 @ 8:19 am

    This is 381-12.

    Army Regulation 381–12
    Military Intelligence
    Subversion and
    Espionage
    Directed
    Against the U.S.
    Army (SAEDA

    https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar381-12.pdf

38. eagleeye
    May 25th, 2009 @ 9:44 am

    Kapaolani Medical Center in Hawaii celebrated its 100 th anniversary on January 24, 2009 with a special letter from President Obama in which he says:

    “As a beneficiary of the excellence of Kapi`olani Medical Center – the place of my birth – I am pleased to add my voice to your chorus of supporters.”

    https://www.kapiolanigift.org/centennial-dinner.aspx?terms=obama

39. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 10:38 am

    Sue, show me a rule that says that the Supreme Court issues stays only in regards to decisions of lower courts.

40. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 10:40 am

    Who is writing under the name American Patriot? Which Lisa?

41. Hungry (For Justice) Homer
    May 25th, 2009 @ 12:24 pm

    Dr. Taitz,
    Ddi you hear SCOTUS clerk suter was part of a delegation to Russia last summer, a “good will” visit, focusing on Russian Court system. Any truth to this.
    You said you respect Suter, but if he went to Russia,in summer 2008, in middle of election year, good somebody have “gotten ” to him?
    Do you want a link to an article about this, if I can find the link?

42. Carrie4Christ
    May 25th, 2009 @ 5:01 pm

    Dear Dr. Taitz,

    I’m a long time reader and supporter of yours who used to post on the old Defend Our Freedoms site. I was ill for quite some time and unable to use the web but I’m much better now and so glad to have found you again! I’m especially glad to read about all your amazing progress and successes. Surely God is smiling down upon you and helping pave the way for your ultimate victory over the forces of darkness and oppression set upon our great nation by none other than Satan himself, working through Barack Obama and others like Nancy Pelosi.

    After reading through your new blog, it struck me that you are trying to take on two enormous tasks. One, to bring these issues to the attention of as many people as possible and two, to act as an attorney and bring your Quo Warranto case to the Supreme Court. This seems like too much for one person to handle, even someone as hardworking and diligent as “Lady Liberty”!!! Wouldn’t it be a prudent course of action to ask a volunteer to handle the media relations portion of your efforts? Someone bright and personable with a good grasp of the facts who can travel and make TV/radio appearances, leaving you free to tackle all these complex legal issues? My father was a patent attorney and I know he spent the majority of his time sequestered with his associates in the law library researching, researching, researching!!! At the very least you should hire an assistant with a strong background in the law to help you!!! Perhaps a pre-law or law student would be willing to volunteer their time over the summer?

    I hope these suggestions are helpful! I wish you the best of luck! God Bless YOU!!!

43. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 5:08 pm

    I am doing this pro bono and donations don’t even cover all my travel around the country to push this issue. I would like to hire an assistant, but can’t afford.

44. Luce
    May 25th, 2009 @ 5:47 pm

    “Who is writing under the name American Patriot? Which Lisa?”

    The poster “American Patriot” has identified himself in previous postings as Mario Apuzzo, the lead attorney in Kerchner v. Obama. He appears to be trying to help you.

45. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 6:01 pm

    actually it is somebody else, who has written Mario apuzzo, just like somebody has written Clarence Thomas, but it wasn’t him

46. Carrie4Christ
    May 25th, 2009 @ 6:08 pm

    Hi Dr.Taitz,

    Wow! I’m honored that you would respond to my post! I understand your financial constraints, which is why I suggested a student volunteer. I’m sure there are many pre-law or law students who would be more than happy to help out a patriot such as yourself free of charge over the summer. As I’m sure you’re aware law students are always looking for ways to distinguish themselves. Imagine being able to put “Assisted Dr.Orly Taitz in exposing the fraud of the century” on your resume!!! Perhaps, you could post adds in student newspapers in your area? UCLA, UC Irvine, Loyola Marymount, etc., etc…

    I just know from being a lawyer’s daughter that research is the foundation of a successful litigation and it really seems that you could use an educated hand as you embark on this most precarious and important part of your journey to victory!!!!!!! God Bless!!!

47. Portuguese Revolutionary War Hero - Peter Francisco
    May 25th, 2009 @ 7:10 pm

    Happy Memorial Day Everyone especially Military Families.
    Read about a Great Revolutionary War Patriot at least Today a great Hero that Shamefully was long ago forgotten. Read about the Virginia Giant Original ARMY OF ONE here:
    https://www.historynet.com/peter-francisco-american-revolutionary-war-hero.htm

    ELIGIBILITY:
    What about this new bill just introduced to prevent anyone from asking the Administration about his Birth Certificate and such. O’Bushama is NOT ABOVE THE LAW, THE CONSTITUTION OR GOD even though he is trying very hard to be. Transparency for Bush and Cheney new Laws of Secrecy for O’Bushama and his THUGS.

    We need to RAISE HELL, Rise Up, Stand UP WAKE UP AMERICA fight on.
    Everyone can tell TWO PEOPLE and SO ON till the whole world knows that we have a Pretender-in-Thief who refuses to be accountable to teh Constitution and American People.

    Read about the bill HR 985 here:
    https://larrysinclair-0926.blogspot.com/2009/05/is-hr-985-meant-to-protect-obama-and.html

    Happy Memorial Day.

48. de Vattel: A natural born citizen is born in the coutnry of parentS who are citizens thereof
    May 25th, 2009 @ 8:22 pm

    One notable Constitutional Lawyer, who was on Plains Radio back in the winter, said that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to ambassadors, means cases in which an Ambassador or Ambassadors are plaintiffs, not defendents. Though he did not say where he got that from.

49. Sheikh yer Bu'Tay
    May 25th, 2009 @ 10:48 pm

    Orly, this post is not for you. Keep doing the legal research while I vent a little.

    Good Lord, what ever happened to the simple justice promised to us within the U.S. Constitiution???

    The wording within the USCON is plain as day. Why is this process so very complicated that a battalion of law clerks is needed just to get the right combination of legalieze worded in just the right way, delivered at just the right moment, to get a Judge (any Judge!) to grant discovery???

    The level of corruption some lower court judges have displayed to stop We the People from learning the truth is disgusting! It’s lower than whale dung (and that rests at the bottom of the ocean)!

    I am sorry I can’t help with legal research. I wouldn’t have a clue how to begin. I will do my part by spreading the word far and wide.

    If the Founding Fathers were alive today, there is no doubt there would be a second Revolution!

50. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 25th, 2009 @ 11:59 pm

    Sue
    don’t you think that usurpation of the position of the President and Commander in Chief is an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant exercise of original jurisdiction, even if it is non-exclusive?

51. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 12:05 am

    It is not in the rules or constitution

52. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 12:08 am

    I cross reference research of a lot of people. In terms of volunteers, there aren’t that many

53. Roland
    May 26th, 2009 @ 12:36 am

    Dr Orly

    Can any of your contact find a group of paralegals or law students who can volunteer work? I know you desperately need extra pairs of hands instead commentary in your website like mine. I wish I could help but I personally can’t.

    Where are the boy scouts and girl scouts, the peace corps.. are we just good in giving out alms, soup, used clothing to african children?

    How about volunteering research work for a constitutional cause? where are you america?

54. Hungry (For Justice) Homer
    May 26th, 2009 @ 9:59 am

    Dr. Taitz,
    Obama is nominating Federal Judge Sonia B Sotomayor to replace David Souter on Supreme Court.

    How will this change your cases before the court? Would it help if we contacted Judge Sotomayor on your behalf, making her aware of your concerns?

    I’m sure the enate Judiciary confirmation hearings could benefit from hearing from you and all of yopur supporters.

    Please tell us what we can do in regards to this Judge Sotomayor

55. nanosecond
    May 26th, 2009 @ 1:43 pm

    Orly, why don’t you subpoena the Russian Ambassador since the Russians had Obama’s passport on that trip?

56. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 2:57 pm

    yap, added him already

57. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 3:06 pm

    you can contact the senate judiciary committee and ask them to inquire her opinion on the issue

58. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 3:30 pm

    People that are going by the name Jack Ryan and Sue. For the last time- the rules state that in special sircumstances SCOTUS will review a case for a stay on original jurisdiction. Usurper, sitting in the White House is such a sircumstance. Tell your friend Barry to stop embarrassing this whole nation and go home.
    In re to Ambassadors- it is up to them to invoke or not to invoke the immunity it is not up to the clerk to decide. How did you pass the bar Sue?

59. nationalditzazter
    May 26th, 2009 @ 3:42 pm

    It figures that Obama would nominate a foreigner to SCOTUS as well. The fix is in.

60. Maggie
    May 26th, 2009 @ 4:00 pm

    I do not see any comments from a Jack Ryan or Sue. What am I missing here?

61. Hungry (For Justice) Homer
    May 26th, 2009 @ 6:09 pm

    Dr. Taitz,
    Are you going to be on Plains Radio tonight (Tues)? If so, what time? And will you be willing to discuss what we all can do regarding SCOTUS nominee Judge Sotomayor and your cases before the court?

    Some crazy, pro Ursurper blog is already claiming Sotomayor was picked because she made a deal to reject any challenge to Barry, in exchange for the nomination. Also, is the story that clerk Danny Bickell used to work for Sotomayor true? Sounds like they’re doing everything they can to stop you. Let us know how we can help.

62. Carrie4Christ
    May 26th, 2009 @ 6:47 pm

    I feel it would be foolhardy to write Judge Sotomayor off simply because she was nominated by Obama. This issue has been ruthlessly quashed by the mainstream media. Perhaps, the Judge is unaware of the facts? Dr. Taitz, I think you should send Judge Sotomayor all your dossiers and other documents ASAP. She is one of the most newsworthy women in the world right now. Maybe she can be the one to help expose this fraud for once and for all. If she reads your brave words and is convinced of their truth, no one will be able to silence her if she chooses to speak out!!!

    I have read that Judge Sotomayor is a Catholic. Why don’t we all try to include her in our prayers and ask that the Lord put His hand on her and help her to see the evil standing beside her and join Dr. Taitz in her fight for justice? Let’s petition him with prayer to help both these women and work through them so that ultimate victory is achieved!!!

63. B Johnson
    May 26th, 2009 @ 6:57 pm

    EXPOSE the USURPER BASTARD now in office so he can be removed
    soon to save the USA

64. AmericanPatriot
    May 26th, 2009 @ 7:10 pm

    If we could force foreign Ambassadors to reveal sealed information by order of SCOTUS, don’t you think we would already have used that power to obtain classified military and security information?

    We may have the right to ask, but foreign Ambassadors are under no REAL legal obligation to give us anything no matter how we ask or how many court orders are issued. It’s sad, but true.

65. Portuguese Revolutionary War Hero - Peter Francisco
    May 26th, 2009 @ 7:27 pm

    ACTION NEEDED ~ ACTION ALERT:

    Please pitch in we have an OPENING HERE:

    This has to go VIRAL:

    An Erosionist LIE-beral is finally pointing out some truths about O’Bushama.
    They’re starting to see him as a Pretender-in-Thief, lets ENCOURAGE THEM.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBHnOiBJEjk

    Watch, RATE, PASS ON and PROMOTE.

66. Leonard Daneman
    May 26th, 2009 @ 7:37 pm

    Dear Orly,

    I tried to call you Monday but you were busy.

    Suggestions:

    1) The Art. II, sec. 1 Eligibility Clause is unique, as it appears only once in U.S. law. There are two or three instances when the term of art appears as dicta, or a fallacious conflation with ‘native born.’ But ‘natural born citizen’ has never been heard as an issue in the District or Appellate courts.

    Therefore, the Eligibility Clause and how it is followed has no viable appellate case law. It is solely under the Original Jurisdiction of the highest court.

    2) I noticed in your Easterling case two plaintiffs who were JAG paralegals. Have you asked them for help?

    3) Today’s nomination of an inferior example of an appellate justice, in intelligence, diligence, reasoning, and character, may influence the other Justices to look again at Obama’s qualifications and eligibility.

    4) I am a paralegal with formal training in research and writing, but very little experience in the Supreme Court except reading SCOTUS opinions.

    I think the uniqueness of the eligibility clause having no appellate precedent, and therefore being solely the pervue of original jurisdiction is a powerful introduction to your case.

    Also, I suggested in the WND article and in my letter to the Justices that an opinion on the definition of the term of art ‘Natural Born Citizen’ would not violate the Political Questions Doctrine.

    It is a shame Landmark Legal, Thomas More, or the Heritage Foundation can’t be of any assistance.

67. eagleeye
    May 26th, 2009 @ 8:21 pm

    nationalditzazter says:
    May 26, 2009 at 3:42 pm
    “It figures that Obama would nominate a foreigner to SCOTUS as well. The fix is in.”

    Foreigner? Sonia Sotomayor was born in New York City in 1954 and was raised within spitting distance of Yankee Stadium. You should check facts before you slander someone. Oh, I see, she is of Puerto Rican descent and that makes her “foreign”. Mmmm hmmmm. Orly, why do allow this when you yourself are an American by choice.

68. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 8:33 pm

    I need to talk to you about a few issues. Call me. The only radio show I am doing tomorrow is Chicago 4 Central, my phone should be o’k the rest of the time

69. Lady Jane Grey
    May 26th, 2009 @ 8:36 pm

    Orly, how do you intend to overcome the major obstacle in your case – to wit, the fact that the Supreme Court does NOT have the power to remove a sitting president? Only Congress may do so, through the mechanism of impeachment. The result you want does not appear to be available through the avenue you are pursuing. Why don’t you spend your time and energy lobbying Congress to begin impeachment proceedings instead of wasting it with the Supremes? I fear all your efforts will come to naught.

70. dr_taitz@yahoo.com
    May 26th, 2009 @ 8:38 pm

    While ambassadors of Kenya, Indonesia and Pakistan probably will not compy, being under a Muslim rule and wanting one of their own in charge in US, ambassadors of Great Britain and Russia might comply voluntarily, they are Christian countries, they are facing the same problems.

71. American Patriot
    May 27th, 2009 @ 2:29 am

    FYI – Puerto Rico is a Commonwealth of the United States. They have nearly all the same rights as those of us born on the mainland. They can vote and they are the benefactors of our protection. They are for all intents and purposes, American Citizens.

    Further, there is no law precluding even Naturalized Citizens from sitting on SCOTUS.

    Obama’s choice is a poor one, but not because of her race, place of birth, gender, or citizenship. The fact that she believes that it’s proper to legislate from the bench is what makes her dangerous. It is in direct opposition to the intent of the Separation of Powers in the Constitution.

    If she wants to legislate, she should run for Congress or Senate and stay keep her butt off the bench.

72. Portuguese Revolutionary War Hero - Peter Francisco
    May 27th, 2009 @ 5:49 am

    FRAUD, FRAUD, FRAUD……

    When one uses FRAUD, FORGERY, etc to win a position or election their shall become NULL and VOID.

    A Naturalized Citizen can only loose their newly aquired citizenship for one reason: If they used FRAUD their citizenhsip is STRIPPED (Null and VOID). So too it shall be with an ELECTION that uses FRAUD and FORGERY, etc.

    CHALLENGE the DOCUMENTS.
    Lets look at the Documents that Obama/Soetoro used to FRAUDULENTLY win an election.
    1- COLB, which has been contested, but it states his name as Barack Obama circa 1961.

    2- Indonesian School Registration (an AP photo authenticated by AP) that states his name is Barry Soetoro, Muslim, Indonesian Citizen.

    Doc #2 came after #1 therefore the latest info we have is that Obama/Soetoro’s last KNOWN NAME was Barry Soetoro…..by what authority does he use Barack Obama to get elected and not his last DOCUMENTED used name? Where are the Documents showing that he Changed his name? Shouldn’t we have had Candidate Barry Soetoro and by extension President Barry Soetoro?
    Did he use FRAUD and an old COLB instead of a Revised BC? Is this why he has SEALED all his records?

    CHALLENGE the DOCUMENTS…..looks like someone PLAYED the SYSTEM and used FRAUD to hide his Identity and Citizenship judging by the ONLY DOCUMENTS available.

    CONSPIRACY, FRAUD and FORGERY Voids this Obama/Soetoro PRESIDENCY.

    CHALLENGE THE DOCUMENTS as FRAUDULENT this will allow Discovery.

73. Portuguese Revolutionary War Hero - Peter Francisco
    May 27th, 2009 @ 5:52 am

    Also IDENTITY THEFT may be in Play here..he may have stole his own identity but it is still FRAUDULENT ACTION to deceive and steal an election.

74. https://BuenaVistaMall.com
    May 27th, 2009 @ 9:29 am

    And all the judges usurper Obama has in his pocket amount to very little compared to the number of soldiers who now know they were lied into illegal wars in Iraq and Afghanistan! ‘We The People’ have the liars surrounded!

75. amy
    May 27th, 2009 @ 11:20 am

    In August, 2005, the year Sen Obama, Lugar, and others were detained, Obama was traveling on a special passport. It had a title of which I cannot remember.. Our US ambassador at the time was newly appointed William Burns.. .If I didnt have to work, I would research it further.
    https://volodymycampaign.blogspot.com/2005/08/us-senators-detained-at-russian.html
    They were not detained because of their passports

76. truthbetold11
    May 27th, 2009 @ 3:01 pm

    I played golf today and happen to partner up with a semi retired social security lawyer. Wow what are the odds? So not one to let a good oppurtunity got to waste. I asked him. So what do you think of BHO social number attached to 100 addresses he was kind of puzzled but interested to learn more. so I told him about Dr Orly and he would check it out. He also mentioned that if a employee looks at his own social number at work 2 days suspension, 14 days if gives info to family members. they take fraud very seriously. Well unless your the president.

77. Cody Judy
    May 28th, 2009 @ 12:26 am

    Hi Orly,
    I keep thinking about the controversy between states, as my case in Nevada, and your case in California, or all the states in which arguments have been made, might represent a controversy of states, as it poses a legal question towards the qualification of the president in a request of the United States (A.G.) in opposing argument. You know how you said in this appeal.. together we can succeed?
    Eligibility Case Archive
    Welcome WorldNetDaily and Drudge Report readers! You have reached my “Eligibility Case Archive” page. This is a listing of all defunct cases. To see a listing of currently pending cases that are publicly known at this time, please see my Eligibility Lawsuits page.
    Defunct Cases:
    • Indiana:
    o Dismissed
    o Steve Ankeny, Bill Kruse: Ankeny v. Daniels (02/27/09)
    • Mississippi:
    o Dismissed with prejudice
    o Daniel Scott Thomas: Thomas v. Hosemann (03/08/09)
    • Kentucky:
    o Daniel John Essek: Essek v. Obama (02/18/09)
    o AmericaMustKnow history
    • Florida:
    o Dismissed
    o Connerat v. Browning (01/02/09)
    • Washington State (James Broe): (02/02/09)
    o Dismissed without comment at the State level; Plaintiffs considering other options
    o Broe v. Reed
    • Nevada (Cody Judy): (01/14/09)
    o Dismissed; “moot”
    o Included Berg v. Obama as Emergency Exhibit of Evidence
    o Judy v. McCain
    • Texas (Darrel Hunter): (01/27/09)
    o DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
    o Hunter v. Obama
    • Ohio (Gordon Stamper): (01/27/09)
    o Dismissed; “appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.”
    o Stamper v. US
    • Texas:
    o Judge: “This Court has no Jurisdiction.“
    o Jody Brockhausen: Brockhausen v. Andrade (01/23/09)
     AmericaMustKnow history
    • Pennsylvania (Phil Berg): (01/21/09)
    o January 16 Conference results: application for stay DENIED
    o January 9 Conference results:
     January 12: Motion for leave to file amicus brief filed by Bill Anderson GRANTED.
     January 12: Petition DENIED.
    o Berg v. Obama
    • District of Columbia:
    o L. Charles Cohen: Cohen v. Obama (12/30/08)
    • Hawaii:
    o Dismissed; important forensic examiner affidavit!
    o Keyes v. Lingle (12/12/08)
    • Connecticut (Cort Wrotnowski): (01/02/09)
    o “Pidgeon reminds us that the Wrotnowski case is still “pending” and procedurally alive.“
    o DENIED application for stay and/or injuction
    o Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz
    • New Jersey (Leo Donofrio): (12/08/08)
    o DENIED application of stay
    o Donofrio v. Wells
    • Georgia:
    o DENIED
    o Rev. Tom Terry: Terry v. Handel (11/12/08)
     AmericaMustKnow history
    • Patriot Brigade Case history
    • California: David Archbold history
    • Virginia: Wild Bill history
    • New York: Dan Smith history
    • Washington: Steve Marquis history
    • Ohio: David Neal history; Carol Greenberg history

    The complex role of the Supreme Court in this system derives from its authority to invalidate legislation or executive actions which, in the Court’ s considered judgment, conflict with the Constitution
    This power of “judicial review” has given the Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as in maintaining a “living Constitution” whose broad provisions are continually applied to complicated new situations
    Madison had written that constitutional interpretation must be left to the reasoned judgment of independent judges, rather than to the tumult and conflict of the political process. (As in the election process being over tumult and Party’s not putting forth candidates that were eligible constitutionally.)
    judicial review was not confirmed until 1803, when it was invoked by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. In this decision, the Chief Justice asserted that the Supreme Court’ s responsibility to overturn unconstitutional legislation was a necessary consequence of its sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. That oath could not be fulfilled any other way. “It is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is,” he declared. (It was unconstitutional legislation that allowed the two parties to pick and promote U.S. constitutionally unqualified candidates, thus it is the duty of the Supreme Court to step into the fray of these legislative bodies who have placed unqualified candidates into the political realm of the trusting public whom were trusting that the legislatative bodies or parties would not do this.)
    Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, a constitution that attempted to detail every aspect of its own application “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind … Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.” ( The “natural born” clause is a great outline, and was carefully designated )
    The Constitution limits the Court to dealing with “Cases” and “Controversies. Thus cases is not the limitation of the court:This controversies word is a big one in the controversy of Obama’s credentials as a constitutionally qualified candidate. What bigger controversy than one of the President’s qualifications as military personals is subject to following or not following orders? (John Jay, the first Chief Justice, clarified this restraint early in the Court’ s history by declining to advise President George Washington on the constitutional implications of a proposed foreign policy decision. The Court does not give advisory opinions; rather, its function is limited only to deciding specific cases.)
    Chief Justice Marshall expressed the challenge which the Supreme Court faces in maintaining free government by noting: “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”

    Rule 1. Clerk
    • 1. The Clerk receives documents for filing with the Court and has authority to reject any submitted filing that does not comply with these Rules
    This should be good enough to assert that the Clerk does not have power to interpret the law within, or assert his opinion, only if it is filed properly
    Controversy certified
    • SCOTUS Rules 2. When a question is certified by a United States court of appeals, this Court, on its own motion or that of a party, may consider and decide the entire matter in controversy. See 28 U. S. C. §1254(2).
    Requesting the Certification of this question might not take too long either, or because there has NEVER been any ruling on this ‘natural born” clause, it maybe ok to make a MOTION to the SCOTUS for a ‘ORIGNL JURISDICTION exception. This would be hard for a clerk to dispute.

    Just ideas… hope in someway it helps.
    Let me know if I can help in any other way.
    Cody Judy
    http://www.codyjudy.us
    codyjudy@hotmail.com

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